A. Introduction

The scope of ‘surveillance’ as a covert policing resource

5.01 The Information Commissioner’s Report on the Surveillance Society written by the Surveillance Studies Network defines surveillance as ‘purposeful, routine, systematic and focused attention paid to personal details, for the sake of control, entitlement, management, influence or protection’. With such a broad compass it is perhaps hardly surprising that the whole report is founded on an assumption, as the opening sentence of the report makes clear, that ‘we live in a surveillance society’.

5.02 It is obvious that only some of these concepts can fall within the ambit of an analysis of the law concerning covert policing. Indeed even the Information Commissioner’s report concedes this, expressing surveillance for its purposes as ‘a set of activities that have a similar characteristic [as opposed] to what the intelligence services or police may define as surveillance’. However, more recently, the Information Commissioner published the ‘Surveillance Road Map: a shared approach to the regulation of surveillance in the United Kingdom’ the purpose of which is:

2 Surveillance Society.
3 Surveillance Society, para 3.1.
4 Surveillance Society.
to clarify the roles and responsibilities of the bodies involved in overseeing legislation concerning surveillance in the United Kingdom. It provides a guide to enable those bodies to work effectively together to ensure that respective roles are understood and that the privacy of individuals is balanced with the legitimate aim of preventing and detecting crime. In order to achieve this balance it is important to have an overview of who is responsible for what and the avenues open to individuals who wish to challenge any surveillance to which they are subjected.\(^6\)

The Surveillance Road Map records that ‘the regulation of surveillance is a complex area’. Interestingly, it is published, not principally for the public, but is ‘aimed at facilitating an understanding between the bodies involved in the regulation of surveillance for their own use’.\(^7\)

It would be wrong to limit the subject to any prescription offered by the intelligence agencies, police or other public authority that carry out surveillance. This is for at least two reasons. First, they are bound by such statutory definitions as exist, informed and developed by the common law (it is this that primarily needs to be considered in the present context). Second, the evolution of the law of the United Kingdom may have presented the intelligence agencies and law enforcement with difficult operational propositions that have broadened the scope of what amounts to surveillance in investigative terms\(^8\) and which requires some unravelling in order to attempt to understand it and practically apply it. In other words, there is that which police, intelligence agencies or relevant public authorities define as surveillance and there is that which they may not, but which may, in fact amount to surveillance in any event. This has led to tensions. The Chief Surveillance Officer reported in his 2012–2013 Annual Report:

*I understand the desire of the Home Office and ACPO [Association of Chief Police Officers] in particular to provide guidance but care is necessary to avoid inaccurate dogma. Likewise I discourage inadequate guidance generated in haste. It is sometimes claimed that there is too much competing guidance; this can be caused by the search for guidance preferable to OSC [Office of Surveillance Commissioners] guidance which may be regarded as inconvenient. Seven Commissioners who have held high judicial office providing a single interpretation of legislation is almost unique. I am unlikely to be persuaded by guidance which is contrary to the opinions produced after careful consideration by my Commissioners. I am even less likely to be persuaded by guidance designed for the convenience of practitioners. Continuous assertion of a view by practitioners does not change the law.*\(^9\)

A more orthodox definition of surveillance is not necessarily any more helpful, one that includes any conduct involving the close monitoring or observation of a person suspected of some wrongdoing,\(^10\) for example. This is clearly too wide to capture the more discrete subject of surveillance as distinct from, say, the interception of communications, or the use and conduct of covert human intelligence sources. It is clear that surveillance has a generic meaning as well as a more specific one.

From these sources, the scope of this chapter can at least be constrained by the statutory definitions of surveillance that have been conceived for the first time in United Kingdom law

---

\(^6\) Surveillance Road Map, page 2.
\(^7\) Surveillance Road Map, page 2.
\(^8\) See the discussion of *Wood v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis* [2009] EWCA Civ 414 later in this chapter at paras 5.186–5.194.
Chapter 5: Surveillance

by the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (RIPA), although none is exhaustive. In addition, consideration should properly be given to ostensibly overt surveillance (such as for example, photography, CCTV, as it has become known, as well as automatic number plate reading technology) which may either have a covert purpose, or where the product is subsequently used covertly in the sense that the person affected by it does not know it has been retained, processed, and disseminated and/or published. This gives rise to the legally complex and volatile issue of the role of consent (which is unfortunately outside the scope of this book) and the evolving and surprisingly controversial question of when an expectation of privacy arises.

Inevitably, brief consideration needs to be given to related topics, including the surveillance of employees, the admissibility of evidence obtained, and the problems caused by surveillance carried out by private individuals.

The structure of this chapter will be to review the definitions of surveillance and then consider the authorization matrix, including that introduced by the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 insofar as it relates to surveillance carried out by local authorities. Thereafter it will look at non-statutory surveillance resources from a legal perspective and consider the practical implications arising from their use as well as touching on surveillance of employees and by private individuals. Consideration will also be given to the issue on what has become known as ‘online surveillance’. Finally, it will briefly look at the evidential issues that are likely to require consideration should the product of surveillance as prescribed by this chapter be needed as proof in legal proceedings.

B. Surveillance Law: Statutory Sources

An overview

Like other forms of covert policing, state surveillance in the United Kingdom has historically been conducted in the absence of a legislative structure governing the basis upon which it should be carried out, how the material gathered as a result of it may be used, and oversight of those carrying it out. Similarly, the evolution of a statutory framework is correlated to challenges to the domestic approach in Strasbourg, although surprisingly, few have touched on the form and nature of surveillance as it is now understood in United Kingdom law and focused instead on trespass to property and the interception of communications. None of the judgments offered guidance as to the definition of surveillance beyond recognizing that the level of intrusiveness of surveillance may be qualitatively different.

---

11 Vaughan v South Oxfordshire District Council, IPT/12/28/C.
12 See this chapter, paras 5.51–5.68.
13 Excluded expressly as amounting to either directed or intrusive surveillance by the Code of Practice, para 2.21.
14 Also excluded, Code of Practice, para 2.21.
15 As in Peck v The United Kingdom, Application No 44647/98, ECHR 2003.
16 See Chapter 2 generally.
17 Private surveillance is considered in detail in Chapter 10.
18 Considered in detail in Chapter 9.
19 Govell v The United Kingdom [1999] EHRLR 101, ECtHR.
20 Khan v The United Kingdom (2001) 31 EHR 45.
21 Malone v The United Kingdom (1985) 7 EHRR 14, ECtHR.
Even the limited governance that existed prior to the enactment of legislation covering surveillance is of relatively recent origin. The first of note was the Guidelines on the Use of Equipment in Police Surveillance Operations issued by the Home Office. These gave Chief Constables the power to authorize the use of listening devices in criminal investigations subject to familiar qualifying criteria, such as, the offences under investigation being really serious, other methods having been tried but failed, and a belief on the part of the officers that a conviction would result. A rudimentary proportionality assessment was required weighing the seriousness of the offence against the level of intrusiveness engaged in.

The United Kingdom’s intelligence services have at different times been placed on a legislative footing—the Security Service (MI5) by virtue of the Security Service Act 1989 and the Secret Intelligence Service (MI6) and Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) following the Intelligence Services Act 1994. Again, the legislation was permissive in the sense that it allowed those agencies to engage in surveillance activities in the broadest sense—including the interference with property—but there were no specific provisions, other than those relating to the interception of communications, relating the nature or type of surveillance that may be carried out.

The Home Office guidelines were placed on a statutory footing by virtue of Part III of the Police Act 1997 and in response to the challenge to the Guidelines before the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in, amongst others, Khan v The United Kingdom on the basis that they offended against the requirements in Article 8(2) being ‘neither legally binding nor accessible’. Emmerson and Ashworth described the Khan case as ‘the immediate catalyst for Part III of the Police Act 1997’. This did not define or regulate surveillance per se but created a regime governing the trespass and installation of listening devices. Part III of the Police Act 1997 Act is considered in detail in Chapter 6.

A Code of Practice on Intrusive Surveillance was issued on 27 October 1998 and revised a year later. This provided guidance on the handling of confidential and privileged material, for example. This was the prevalent regime until RIPA came into force in September and October 2002.

In terms of basic principles, a number can be derived from the Strasbourg decisions. Covert surveillance is a serious interference with privacy rights and must therefore be prescribed by law and be necessary and proportionate. Importantly the law must be precise and clear so that those who may be subjected to it have a sufficient indication as to the circumstances when it may be used. As will become clear, serious questions arise about the clarity of RIPA in respect of surveillance activities and related issues. The preoccupation of the ECtHR is to achieve ‘a proper balance between the defence of the institutions of democracy in the common interest and the protection of individual rights’.

Principles specific to covert policing include that the use of such resources should be limited to serious and properly defined offences, it should not be exploratory or of a general nature.

---

24 Khan v The United Kingdom (2001) 31 EHRR 45, para 23.
26 Emmerson and Ashworth, Human Rights and Criminal Justice, 212.
27 18 November 1999.
29 Kopp v Switzerland (1987) 27 EHRR 91, ECtHR.
30 See, eg, A v France (1993) 17 EHRR 462, ECtHR.
31 Malone v The United Kingdom (1985) 7 EHRR 14, ECtHR.
32 Malone v The United Kingdom (1985) 7 EHRR 14, ECtHR.
33 Brogan and Others v The United Kingdom (1989) 11 EHRR 117, para 48.
and should be limited to cases where conventional means of enquiry are ineffective or have been unsuccessful.  


5.16 Chapter 1 considered the evolution of RIPA. It placed covert monitoring activities, other than the interception of communications, on a statutory footing for the first time in United Kingdom law. Ferguson and Wadham described the 2000 Act in the following terms:

On the one hand, it facilitated the use of diverse investigatory activities, while on the other, it provided a comprehensive regulatory framework, designed to respect the obligations imposed by the Human Rights Act 1998. In doing so it struck a fragile balance between the competing demands of privacy and surveillance.

5.17 There is a division between other respected commentators and practitioners some of whom have said that RIPA ‘goes a long way towards meeting this country’s obligations, and is to be welcomed’ whilst another has argued that ‘the value of privacy still finds little place in it despite the fact that the central statute now governing this area [RIPA] was introduced specifically to meet the demands of the European Convention on Human Rights’.

5.18 RIPA is in five parts. Part I contains two chapters. Chapter I is concerned with the interception of communications and Chapter II, the acquisition and disclosure of communications data. There are accompanying Codes of Practice issued under the provisions of section 71 of RIPA.

5.19 Part II, which concerns some of the activities with which this chapter is largely concerned, relates to the regulation of surveillance activities and the use and conduct of covert human intelligence sources. It creates a two-tier authorization process to reflect the nature of the intrusiveness that is likely to be engaged in although the legitimacy of this has been questioned.

5.20 Part III is concerned with the investigation of data protected by encryption and Part IV, oversight. Part V deals with miscellaneous and supplemental provisions concerning the Act, related legislation and repeals and commencement. It also contains the Schedules referred to in earlier sections of the Act.

**Section 80**

5.21 Part V, although the last part of RIPA, is ironically one of the most important, particularly in the context of Part II activities, since it contains provisions that have a profound impact on how the legislation should be viewed in relation to its requirements and the protections it purports to extend. Section 80 is the best illustration, although characteristically obtuse in terms of the language employed:

80. Nothing in any provision of this Act by virtue of which conduct of any description is or may be authorised by any warrant, authorisation or notice, or by virtue of which information may be obtained in any manner shall be construed—

---

36 Ferguson and Wadham, ‘Privacy and Surveillance’.
38 H Fenwick, *Civil Liberties and Human Rights*, 3rd edn (Cavendish, 2005) 635.
B. Surveillance Law: Statutory Sources

(a) as making it unlawful to engage in any conduct of that description which is not otherwise unlawful under this Act and would not be unlawful apart from this Act;

(b) as otherwise requiring—
   (i) the issue, grant or giving of such a warrant, authorisation or notice, or
   (ii) the taking of any step for or towards obtaining the authority of such a warrant, authorisation or notice,

Before any such conduct of that conduct is engaged in; or

(c) as prejudicing any power to obtain information by any means not involving conduct that may be authorised under this Act.

The effect of this provision, once unpicked, is concerned in the most general sense with any conduct that may be engaged in under RIPA (for simplicity’s sake this is referred to in this and subsequent paragraphs as ‘covert conduct’). It does not make it unlawful to engage in covert conduct that would otherwise require some form of authorization or for such an authorization to be contemplated under RIPA. In other words it does not create, by virtue of providing an authorization regime for covert conduct, an unlawful act of not obtaining or taking steps to obtain an authorization for the covert conduct. Nor does it create a preferential legislative regime.

If a relevant public authority has the power to obtain the information another way, it is not required to use RIPA just because the information may be obtained by engaging in covert conduct. The Code of Practice provides:

[An] authorisation under the 2000 Act is not required if a public authority has another clear legal basis for conducting covert surveillance likely to result in the obtaining of private information about a person. For example the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 provides a legal basis for the police covertly to record images of a suspect for the purposes of identification and obtaining certain evidence.

Although section 80 was not relied on by either party in\( R (NTL Group Ltd) v Crown Court at Ipswich\)\(^{41}\) it is an example of how the provision could have worked in practice. An application for judicial review was brought by NTL following service on them by the police of a notice under section 9 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (PACE), requiring them to produce information relating to a customer’s email address. In order to comply with the request, it was necessary to copy and send the emails to a separate email address, which would amount to an unlawful interception under section 1 of RIPA. The Administrative Court held that the effect of the order under section 9 of PACE was to provide lawful authority under section 1(5) of RIPA and that no offence was therefore committed.

Section 80 arguably makes RIPA no more than a voluntary code, indeed, the Investigatory Powers Tribunal (IPT) has referred to it as such expressly.\(^{42}\) It provides protection from allegations of unlawfulness or impropriety, although this is clearly not its effect.\(^{43}\) This is fundamental and its absence in many of the judgments in this area worrying. It could reasonably be expected to be a feature of any prosecution response to challenges by the defence that the provisions of the Act have been breached or not applied at all, although in a number of cases the provision has not been referred to.\(^{44}\)

\(^{40}\) Code of Practice, para 1.15.  
\(^{41}\) [2002] 3 WLR 1173.  
\(^{42}\) C v Police and Secretary of State, No IPT/03/32/H, 14 November 2006.  
\(^{43}\) See R v Sutherland (Nottingham Crown Court, 29 January 2002) as just one example.  
\(^{44}\) See, by way of just one glaring example, R v Rosenberg [2006] EWCA Crim 6.
Section 27

5.26 Where an authorization is granted under Part II, section 27 of RIPA is engaged and the surveillance will be considered to be lawful ‘for all purposes’, providing a Part II authorization ‘confers an entitlement to engage in that conduct on the person whose conduct it is’ (ie the conduct engaged in under the terms of the authorization is by the person referred to in the authorization) and ‘his conduct is in accordance with the authorisation’ (ie the conduct does not exceed that specified in the authorization). Importantly, it does not confer immunity from criminal activity.

5.27 No civil liability arises out of the conduct authorized under Part II or which is incidental to it and ‘is not itself conduct an authorisation or warrant for which is capable of being granted under a relevant enactment and might reasonably have been expected to have been sought in the case in question’. This latter element of what would limit civil liability is almost impenetrable but appears to extend to conduct that cannot in fact be authorized under ‘a relevant enactment’ (RIPA and the legislation discussed in paragraphs 5.09–5.13) even if there may have been a reasonable expectation that such an authorization (one that could not in fact be given) should have been sought.

5.28 The conduct that may be authorized under Part II includes conduct outside the United Kingdom. This does not necessarily make the conduct lawful outside the jurisdiction, this will depend on the law of the country where the conduct takes place but it will make it lawful for the purposes of United Kingdom law.

5.29 In AJK and others v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis and others Tugendhat J put a metaphorical ‘toe in the water’ in attempting to make sense of sections 27 and 80. His Lordship described the provisions in these terms, ‘lawful conduct (which, by s 80, does not require authorization) and unlawful conduct, which does, if it is to become lawful pursuant to s 27’. This view is difficult to square with the decision in C v Police and Secretary of State. In that case the IPT held that ‘surveillance by public authorities is not of itself unlawful’ and that ‘there is no general prohibition in RIPA against conducting directed surveillance with RIPA authorization’. Indeed, the Chief Surveillance Commissioner has recently made the same point, ‘failure to obtain authorization for… Part II activity is not unlawful’.

5.30 Where the learned judge may have fallen into error in approaching what he described as a ‘distinction [that] raises difficult issues’ is by conflating lawfulness for the purposes of Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), that is to say sufficient legal basis for the activity (this seems to be the rationale of the IPT in C v Police and Secretary of State) with unlawfulness in either the tortious sense or in that the activity amounts to a criminal offence. In summary, authorization under s 27 would appear to estop allegations of unlawfulness, providing the conduct is kept within its confines (although this is not how it is being applied) and s 80 makes it plain that where no s 27 authorization is in place, other than where it would be a tort or an offence, the activity is not unlawful.

45 RIPA, s 27(1). 46 RIPA, s 27(1)(a). 47 RIPA, s 27(1)(b).
48 RIPA, s 27(2)(a). 49 RIPA, s 27(2)(b). 50 RIPA, s 27(3).
54 IPT/03/32/H. 55 C v Police and Secretary of State IPT/03/32/H, para 42.
56 C v Police and Secretary of State IPT/03/32/H, para 62.
59 C v Police and Secretary of State IPT/03/32/H, para 64.
The Code of Practice

A Code of Practice on Covert Surveillance (the former Code of Practice) was published following but some considerable time after RIPA came into force. A revised Code of Practice was introduced on 6 April 2010 (the Code of Practice) which incorporated expressly guidance on property interference. Surprisingly, in its introduction, it states that ‘where covert surveillance activities are unlikely to result in the obtaining of private information about a person or where there is a separate legal basis for such activities, neither the 2000 Act nor this Code need apply’. This is a remarkably primitive analysis of one of the most complex laws on the statute book, which does not appear in the former Code of Practice and those public authorities engaged in covert activities will need to be cautious in approaching the regulation of covert surveillance this simplistically.

The Code of Practice is admissible in criminal and civil proceedings. If relevant to an issue before a court or tribunal or the Office of the Surveillance Commissioner, the Code of Practice must be taken into account.

C. Statutory Definitions of Surveillance

Surveillance

RIPA creates a regulatory regime for two types of surveillance—directed and intrusive. In typical form, some of the most important elements of the definition of surveillance are found in the last section of Part II.

Surveillance includes (so is not limited to) monitoring, observing, or listening to persons, their movements, their conversations, or their other activities or communications. It extends to the recording of such activity and the use of a surveillance device (defined as ‘any apparatus designed or adapted for use in surveillance’) either wholly or in part to carry out any of the surveillance activity.

There have been two important decisions of principle relating to the definition of surveillance in the IPT. In Vaughan v South Oxfordshire District Council, the local authority had engaged in activity to ascertain the validity of a claim for council tax relief. The key findings of fact were that (i) the purpose of the property inspections was to observe the state of the property to form a view whether the property remained uninhabitable and unoccupied, or whether it was inhabited by Mr Vaughan as his sole or main residence; (ii) all the actions of the inspector at the property were directed to the proper purpose of gaining information about the state of the property and whether it was or was not occupied; (iii) the manner in which the inspections were carried out did not involve the monitoring or observing of Mr Vaughan or any other persons at the property; (iv) the inspections were carried out openly, in daylight, and without any attempt to conceal the activity of the inspector from any persons who might be on the premises, or any neighbours or passers-by.

The IPT held:

The definition contained in s 48(2) is inclusive, not exhaustive, but it is clear from the context of the act that surveillance must be directed at persons. It is only if persons are the...
subject of surveillance that it is necessary to control the exercise of surveillance powers, and only if persons are affected by surveillance that any issue of interference with rights of privacy arises. This is supported by s 26(9) which refers to persons who are the subject of surveillance. It should be noted that s 48(2) provides that the monitoring or observation is of activities of persons, that is their movements, conversations, communications or other activities. So conduct which consisted solely of the observation or inspection of the property of a person, for example the inspection of an abandoned vehicle, would not in itself constitute surveillance.

…Although s 48(2) states that surveillance ‘includes’ the monitoring and recording of the activities of persons, it is very difficult to envisage that there could be any surveillance which does not include some of such defined conduct. The way in which s 48(2) is drafted means that conduct which has as its purpose such monitoring or observation would be surveillance within the meaning of the act, even if no actual monitoring of any persons took place. For example the observation of a deserted property, for the purpose of monitoring the activities of any persons who visited, would be surveillance. [Section] 48(2) might also encompass incidental acts, in addition to recording which is specifically covered at subsection 2(b), if such acts were done in furtherance of the purpose of observing or monitoring the activities of persons.

…Thus in this context the word surveillance means acts of monitoring or observing the activities of persons. To ascertain whether there has been surveillance it is relevant to consider the purpose of the monitoring or observation, and the manner in which it is carried out.

…There was in this case no surveillance within the meaning of s 26. The purpose of the inspections was to ascertain whether the property was unoccupied or not. Mr Vaughan was not the subject, or intended subject, of any monitoring or observation. There was no intention to monitor or observe the activities of any occupant of the house, and in fact as he found the property to be unoccupied the inspector engaged in no such observation or monitoring. The observations of the inspector, including the taking of photographs, were observations of the state of the property.

5.37 In *Re: a complaint of surveillance* the IPT held that ‘the core activity of “surveillance” itself is not defined in s 26, nor is it defined in s 48…s 48(2) refers to “surveillance”, but does not define it’.

5.38 The IPT ruled:

[Section] 48 (2) of RIPA, which applies for the interpretation of Part II of RIPA, uses expressions such as ‘in the course of surveillance’ in (b) and ‘surveillance by a surveillance device’ in (c), but without providing any statutory definition of surveillance itself. Instead of enacting a definition of ‘surveillance’ Parliament has chosen to use a familiar legislative technique of deeming.

5.39 The Tribunal reached four conclusions on s 48:

First, the subsection refers to ‘surveillance’ in (b) and (c), as well as in the opening words, in a manner that assumes that it has an accepted meaning. It was not considered necessary either to define or to describe it as such. Surveillance is essentially an intelligence gathering activity. It involves the use of various means. The person who is subject to surveillance is intended to remain unaware of those means and does not engage with the person secretly gathering the intelligence.

---

69 **IPT/A1/2013**.
70 **Re: a complaint of surveillance** IPT/A1/2013, para 3.
71 **Re: a complaint of surveillance** IPT/A1/2013, para 10.
C. Statutory Definitions of Surveillance

...Secondly, the purpose and effect of the deeming technique in the drafting of s 48(2) is to provide that in Part II surveillance includes methods of intelligence gathering activities that might not be covered by surveillance in ordinary English usage. It may operate to amplify the ordinary meaning.

...Thirdly, the common features of (a) (b) and (c) are that (i) none of them refers to the purpose of the activities described and (ii) all the activities described are different ways in which, for the purposes of Part II, intelligence about a person may be gathered without that person ever being aware of the means used: by monitoring, observing or listening to that person, or by recording those things in the course of surveillance, or by using a surveillance device. In brief, s 48(2) identifies particular aspects of the manner in which intelligence gathering may take place, without expressly defining surveillance itself, or providing when or where it takes place, or who is conducting it.

...Fourthly, by s 48(2)(b) ‘recording anything monitored, observed or listened to’ is surveillance, if such recording is of monitoring etc ‘in the course of surveillance.’ Thus, if the recording is not ‘in the course of surveillance’, it is not itself rendered surveillance by the subsection.

From these two decisions it is possible to distil a number of elements that assist in understanding the definition. First, it is the surveillance of persons, not property (this seems an unusually narrow interpretation and may be inconsistent with Strasbourg jurisprudence). Second, it is not limited to technological means. Third, it is intended by those carrying out the surveillance that the subject is unaware the surveillance may be taking place. Fourth, recording the subject, even if done covertly, is not of determinative importance: it is only relevant if it takes place during activity that amounts to surveillance in fact.

Surveillance also extends to the interception of communications in the course of their transmission subject to the strict requirement that either the sender or recipient consents to the interception and there is no warrant issued in connection with the interception (although why a warrant would be issued in such circumstances is not clear). The circumstances when surveillance can amount to an interception of communications are rare: see, for example, R v McDonald, Rafferty and O’Farrell but also Henderson and Marnoch v Her Majesty’s Advocate where the Scottish Appeal Court appears to have fallen into error by considering a recording device attached to a telephone was an interception.

It excludes any conduct of a covert human intelligence source whether he or she is wearing a surveillance device or not or information disclosed in the presence of a source and the use of a source for obtaining or recording information. It also excludes trespass to and interference with property or wireless telegraphy unless authorized under s 5 of the Intelligence Service Act 1994 or Part III of the Police Act 1997.

Matters common to both directed and intrusive surveillance

Section 26(9) sets out matters common to both forms of surveillance. The surveillance, whether directed or intrusive, must be carried out covertly and involve the acquisition of private information.
Chapter 5: Surveillance

5.44 Surveillance is carried out covertly if and only if ‘it is carried out in a manner that is calculated to ensure that persons that are subject to the surveillance are unaware that it is or may be taking place’. This may create difficulties. On the one hand, the intention of the relevant officers falls to be examined (what they intended the effect of the surveillance would be on those targeted by it) but on the other, the issue may be whether the target was subjectively aware first, that it was taking place in fact or secondly, suspected that it may have been. The latter was the approach preferred by the Court of Appeal in R v Rosenberg, although it is respectfully submitted that the former is the correct interpretation.

5.45 Private information is an express element of directed surveillance but it is axiomatic that it is also an element of intrusive surveillance. Private information in relation to a person includes any information relating to his or her private or family life. This places it squarely within the scope of Article 8 and should be read so as to encompass the broad definition given to concepts of private and family life in accordance with domestic law and the jurisprudence of the ECtHR.

5.46 The Code of Practice helpfully makes it clear that even in a public place an expectation of privacy may exist, particularly ‘where a record is being made by a public authority of that person’s activities for future consideration or analysis’. Further examples are given where the effect of information gathering may amount cumulatively to an interference with privacy.

5.47 A request for an authority that combines an application for the use of directed surveillance (or use and conduct of a covert human intelligence source) and an application for the use of intrusive surveillance must be considered separately by the appropriate authorizing officer. If the application includes an application to the Secretary of State for the use of intrusive surveillance the combined application must be made to the Secretary of State.

5.48 The Code of Practice incorporates the modern concept of ‘collaborative working’. This suggests that those granting authorizations should be aware ‘of particular sensitivities in the local community where surveillance is taking place’, something akin but hopefully not a precursor to Privacy Impact Assessments, which may not be appropriate in the covert policing arena.

5.49 The Policing and Crime Act 2009 amended RIPA so as to provide for the authorization of surveillance in the context of collaborative policing. The provisions are considered further in this chapter. The Chief Surveillance Officer recorded in his 2012–2013 Annual Report:

In relation to covert policing the consequences of collaboration are different from amalgamation, most obviously because the legislation requires each force to have its own authorizing officers. Where collaborating forces have previously adopted different but compliant structures and processes I have rejected calls to give my preference. I have also directed that forces must work within the legislation which, in some respects, limits the corporate approach which they would like to take.
In addition, where one public authority is acting on behalf of another, the tasking authority should obtain or provide the authorization. If operational support is required at the planning stage this should be specified in the authorization. Duplication of authorizations should be avoided.

**Directed surveillance**

Section 26 creates amongst other things two forms of surveillance—directed and intrusive. The section cryptically provides that ‘surveillance is directed…if it is covert but not intrusive’ and meets three criteria. Firstly, it is carried out for the purposes of a specific investigation or a specific operation. Secondly, it is carried out in such a manner as is likely to result in the obtaining of private information about a person (whether specifically identified as part of the specific investigation or operation, so in fact, any person). Thirdly, it is carried out other than by way of an immediate response to events or circumstances that is such that it would be reasonably impracticable to obtain an authority to engage in the surveillance activity.

Covert surveillance is defined in s 26(9). Surveillance is covert if, and only if, it is carried out in a manner that is calculated to ensure that persons who are subject to the surveillance are unaware that it is or may be taking place.

There is an exception to what may amount to directed surveillance provided for in section 26(6). Activities relating to the detection of television licence evasion do not amount to directed surveillance, provided these are carried out from outside the premises and are done so exclusively for that purpose. It is difficult to see how determining whether a household is in possession of a television set using this technology could ever amount to the obtaining of private information about a person. This is more so when the government has argued in the past that the acquisition and retention of a DNA profile, for example, does not constitute such interference.

There are two cases where the issue of what amounted to private information has arisen. Both originate from Scotland. In *Henderson and Marnoch v Her Majesty’s Advocate*, the Scottish Appeal Court held that recordings of threats of violence and extortion that took place without appropriate authorization being in place ‘can hardly be described as comprising of “private information”’. In *Kinloch v Her Majesty’s Advocate*, the Supreme Court approved an earlier decision of the Scottish Appeal Court in *Gilchrist v Her Majesty’s Advocate*. In *Gilchrist*, Lord Macfadyen, giving the opinion of the court, said:

What took place in Albion Street at the relevant time was that the plastic bag was handed by the first appellant to the second appellant. This was done in a public place. The event was there to be observed by anyone who happened to be in the vicinity, whatever the reason for their presence might be. It was in fact observed by police officers. They had reason to suspect that criminal activity was taking place. They therefore detained the appellants. On further investigation it was found that the bag contained controlled drugs. The sequence of events did not involve the obtaining of private information about the second appellant, in the sense mention in section 1(9) or in any broader sense. Nor did it involve any lack

---

96 Code of Practice, para 3.16.  
97 Code of Practice, para 3.17.  
98 See generally Chapter 2.  
99 RIPA, s 26(2)(a).  
100 RIPA, s 26(2)(b).  
101 RIPA, s 26(9)(a).  
102 *S and Marper v The United Kingdom* (Application Nos 30562/04 and 30566/04), 4 December 2008.  
103 2005 SLT 429.  
104 *Henderson and Marnoch v Her Majesty’s Advocate* 2005 SLT 429, para 10.  
106 2005 (1) JC 34.
of respect for the second appellant's private life. What was done did not, in our opinion, amount to an infringement of the second appellant’s rights under article 8.107

5.55 The Supreme Court in *Kinloch* approved this approach. Lord Hope delivering the judgment of the court said:

I think that the answer to it is to be found by considering whether the appellant had a reasonable expectation of privacy while he was in public view as he moved between his car and the block of flats where he lived and engaged in his other activities in places that were open to the public. Although Lord Macfadyen did not say so in as many words, it is plain that this was the basis for the decision in *Gilchrist v HM Advocate*. I would hold that it was rightly decided on this issue. There is nothing in the present case to suggest that the appellant could reasonably have had any such expectation of privacy. He engaged in these activities in places where he was open to public view by neighbours, by persons in the street or by anyone else who happened to be watching what was going on. He took the risk of being seen and of his movements being noted down. The criminal nature of what he was doing, if that was what it was found to be, was not an aspect of his private life that he was entitled to keep private. I do not think that there are grounds for holding that the actions of the police amounted to an infringement of his rights under article 8.108

5.56 In *C v Police and Secretary of State*,109 a case before the IPT, an issue arose as whether the conduct engaged in amounted to directed surveillance and if so whether it needed to be authorized. C was a retired police officer suspected of malingering and had been subjected to surveillance by enquiry agents instructed by his employer. C complained that the surveillance should have been authorized under RIPA. In the course of its judgment the Tribunal considered the definition of directed surveillance and in particular the requirement that the surveillance was undertaken for a specific investigation or operation in accordance with section 26(2)(a).

5.57 The Tribunal interpreted the provision narrowly as limiting directed surveillance ‘to the discharge of the public authority’s particular public or “core functions” specific to it’.110 It went on to state that ‘the definition of “directed surveillance” in section 26 must be read in the context of the scheme of RIPA as a whole’.111 In this connection a relevant factor was whether an authorization would have been sought and obtained *in principle*. This is a useful test and one which, if applied to cases where the question of authorization arises, will assist the court in resolving the issue.

5.58 The Code of Practice covers the effect of the decision in *C*.112 Difficulties will arise where the investigation may be both criminal and disciplinary and each case will need to be decided on its own facts. This is likely to be a challenging area for police professional standards departments who should seek advice in every case. Those representing officers or advising disciplinary panels may also need to consider the issue carefully in order to determine whether an authorization should have been put in place.

*Other cases*

5.59 In *R v Rosenberg*113 the appellant had been convicted at first instance of drug-related offences following the admission of video footage obtained by her neighbours (they had erected a

---

107 *Gilchrist v Her Majesty’s Advocate* 2005 (1) JC 34, para 21.
109 IPT/03/32/H, 14 November 2006.
110 *C v Police and Secretary of State* IPT/03/32/H, 14 November 2006, para 57.
111 *C v Police and Secretary of State* IPT/03/32/H, 14 November 2006, para 61.
C. Statutory Definitions of Surveillance

CCTV camera in their garden which filmed activities inside Ms Rosenberg’s living room. On appeal it was argued that the surveillance should have been authorized under RIPA as the police had been complicit in the acquisition of it. The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal on the basis that the camera was ‘ostentatious’ and therefore not covert but a simpler and more forensic approach would have been, applying C, to determine whether the surveillance could have in fact been authorized and obtained in principle. Since it was not in fact carried out by the police, it is likely that this alone would have been a determinative factor in itself.

A similar issue arose in R v Leadbetter, a case in the lower courts where the defendant argued that surveillance carried out on animal rights activists should have been authorized under RIPA. The District Judge concluded that ‘the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 applies’ (although did not specify which provisions applied or how). Again, if the issue was approached in the way suggested in C, it is respectfully submitted that it would have been determined differently. Neither case considered the jurisprudence from Strasbourg. The issue of whether the facts give rise to a basis upon which to authorize the activity as use and conduct of a covert human intelligence source is considered in Chapter 7.

Intrusive surveillance

The matrix for authorizing intrusive surveillance creates a system of independent review and the possibility that any application granted may not be approved and therefore takes effect. This has received some tentative support from Fenwick who has said ‘the standard of scrutiny may be variable, but the very fact that an authorisation will be checked independently may tend to foster rigour in preparing the papers’. Surveillance is intrusive if it is carried out in relation to anything taking place on any residential premises or in any private vehicle and involves the presence of an individual on the premises or in the vehicle or is carried out by means of a surveillance device.

Residential premises are defined in section 48(1):

‘[R]esidential premises’ means . . . so much of any premises as is for the time being occupied or used by any person, however temporarily, for residential purposes or otherwise as living accommodation (including hotel or prison accommodation that is so occupied or used).

This is subject to a qualification in respect of common areas to which the person may have or be allowed access in connection with the use or occupation of the premises. The updated Code of Practice provides examples of what would and would not qualify. A rented flat, prison cell or hotel room are examples of the former; the communal stairwell of a block of flats, police canteen or hotel reception examples of the latter. Fenwick has expressed concern about whether this reflects correctly a sophisticated approach to surveillance activities:

[The distinction between directed surveillance and ‘general law enforcement’ functions, such as observing persons entering or leaving a house, turns on the question whether or not the observation can be viewed as an immediate response—another instance in which fine

---

114 Bournemouth Magistrates’ Court on 4 November 2009, District Judge Parsons.
115 Fenwick, Civil Liberties and Human Rights, 698.
116 RIPA, s 26(3)(a).
117 RIPA, s 26(3)(b).
118 RIPA, s 48(7)(b).
119 Code of Practice, para 2.15.
120 Code of Practice, para 2.16.
lines may be drawn. If observation of a house occurs over a period of time, it can be argued that an invasion of privacy is occurring that can no longer be viewed as an immediate response and which requires therefore a statutory underpinning.\textsuperscript{121}

5.65 Private vehicles are also defined in section 48(1) as ‘any vehicle which is used primarily for the private purposes of the person who owns it or of a person otherwise having the right to use it’. It excludes a person using a taxi (but not the taxi driver) or other vehicle where they have paid for the use of the vehicle and driver for a journey.\textsuperscript{122} Other examples are provided in the Code of Practice.\textsuperscript{123} In \textit{R v Plunkett and another}\textsuperscript{124} Sir John Thomas, as he then was, held that police vehicles were not private vehicles for the purposes of RIPA.\textsuperscript{125} This decision was followed in \textit{R v Khan and others}.\textsuperscript{126}

5.66 Again, monitoring for the purposes of investigating television licence evasion is excluded from conduct that would amount to intrusive surveillance\textsuperscript{127} as it is the product from a device that monitors anything taking place on residential premises or in a private vehicle\textsuperscript{128} but where the device is not located on the premises or in the vehicle unless ‘it consistently provides information of the same quality and detail as might be expected to be obtained from a device actually present on the premises or in the vehicle’.\textsuperscript{129} Any surveillance by way of a device adapted for the purpose of providing information about the location of a vehicle\textsuperscript{130} or which amounts to an interception of a communication\textsuperscript{131} as falls within section 48(4) is not intrusive surveillance. The updated Code of Practice provides guidance that either forms of conduct may amount to directed surveillance.\textsuperscript{132}

5.67 If the surveillance involves trespass to or interference with property or wireless telegraphy, Part III of the Police Act 1997 or the Intelligence Services Act 1994 applies.\textsuperscript{133}

5.68 The Information Commissioner, in response to the draft Bill,\textsuperscript{134} expressed the view that intrusive surveillance should include ‘any premises or location where the individual has a legitimate expectation of privacy such as a doctor’s surgery. Some commentators have also been critical of the definition suggesting that ‘the attempt to draw a line between “directed” and “intrusive” surveillance may bring the operation of RIPA 2000 into conflict with the requirements of Article 8’.\textsuperscript{135} Whittaker has argued that ‘some directed surveillance may nonetheless be considered sufficiently intrusive to warrant greater protection from misuse than is currently provided for under RIPA 2000’.\textsuperscript{136} This was a pointed analysis. In the later case of \textit{In Re McE}\textsuperscript{137} the House of Lords held that RIPA permitted covert surveillance of consultations between solicitors and their clients although directed surveillance authorizations should be treated as if the conduct was intrusive. Subsequently, the Regulation of Investigatory Powers (Extension of Authorisation Provisions: Legal Consultations) Order 2010\textsuperscript{138} was approved by parliament.

\textsuperscript{121} Fenwick, \textit{Civil Liberties and Human Rights}, 699.
\textsuperscript{122} RIPA, s 48(7)(a).
\textsuperscript{123} Code of Practice, para 2.17.
\textsuperscript{124} [2013] EWCA Crim 261.
\textsuperscript{125} See also \textit{King and Donovan v R}\textsuperscript{[2012]} EWCA Crim 805.
\textsuperscript{126} [2013] EWCA Crim 2230.
\textsuperscript{127} RIPA, s 26(6).
\textsuperscript{128} RIPA, s 26(5)(a).
\textsuperscript{129} RIPA, s 26(5)(b).
\textsuperscript{130} RIPA, s 26(4)(a).
\textsuperscript{131} RIPA, s 26(4)(b).
\textsuperscript{132} Code of Practice, paras 2.8 and 2.20.
\textsuperscript{133} See RIPA, s 48(3) and generally Chapter 6, Property Interference.
\textsuperscript{137} [2009] UKHL 15.
\textsuperscript{138} SI 2010/461.
D. Applications for Authorization: Requirements

General best practice

There is guidance in the updated Code of Practice to what is referred to as 'general best practice'. Although there is no statutory requirement, it is also essential that a proper regime of review is in place within any relevant public authority, a matter upon which the Office for the Surveillance Commissioner has commented in his Annual Report. The updated Code of Practice properly notes that there is 'a need to review authorisations frequently where the surveillance or property interference involves a high level of intrusion into private life or significant collateral intrusion, or confidential information is likely to be obtained'.

The frequency of reviews should be considered at the outset of the operation and should be 'as frequently as is considered necessary and practicable'. The authorising officer may delegate the reviewing function but the updated Code of Practice warns against this as the authorising officer is 'usually best placed to assess whether the authorisation should continue or whether the criteria on which he based the original decision . . . have changed sufficiently to cause the authorisation to be revoked'.

Whoever carries out the review must be alert to any unforeseen changes to the nature or extent to which the level of interference with privacy has changed or any proposed changes. The whole basis of the granting of the authority may need to be reconsidered, including its necessity and/or proportionality. This is particularly important where the identity of the target of the operation was not known but is later established.

The best practice guidance in relation to the applications for authorization includes avoiding unnecessary information and the repetition of information, keeping detailed records of decisions granted orally under urgent procedures, detailing the involvement of other agencies and avoiding duplication of authorizations already given. In addition, the senior responsible officer (someone who holds the rank or position of an authorising officer) should be responsible for the integrity of the internal processes, managing and compliance with authorizations, and engaging with the Office for the Surveillance Commissioner.

Local authorities are advised to ensure the senior responsible officer is a member of the 'corporate leadership team' and should ensure compliance with the Annual Reports of the Office of the Surveillance Commissioner and that the reports form part of an annual policy review. These are all matters that can be introduced into the evidence in any case and in respect of which appropriate witnesses can be cross-examined.

In practice there are a number of questions that can be set out and answered by way of a basic framework for operational planning: is it a public authority authorized under RIPA to carry out surveillance; is it entitled to authorize the conduct that it proposes to engage in; have the rules governing authorization been observed (including those relating to urgent
applications and renewals); is the wording of the authority sufficiently precise; is the analysis of necessity and proportionality sound?

Directed surveillance authorizations

**Designated persons**

5.75 Directed surveillance authorizations

Designated persons are identified by Order\(^{150}\) and may be subject to restrictions on the authorizations they may grant\(^{156}\) and the circumstances in which or the purposes for which they may grant authorizations.\(^{157}\) Frustratingly, the provisions relating to designated persons are found after those relating to authorizations. Within a police force the designated person must hold the rank of a superintendent or in urgent cases an inspector, an officer in the Security Service must hold the position of General Duties 3 or be any other officer at Level 3 and within the Post Office, the designated person is the Territorial Security Officer.\(^{158}\)

5.76 Authorizations for directed surveillance are governed by section 29. Designated persons for the purposes of this section have power to grant authorizations for the carrying out of directed surveillance but can only do so if they believe there are grounds to do so\(^{159}\) and the proposed surveillance to be authorized is proportionate\(^{160}\) to what is sought to be achieved by carrying it out.\(^{161}\) The Chief Surveillance Officer has emphasized that this exercise must be carried out conscientiously by authorizing officers\(^{162}\) and they should expect to be rigorously tested on it in cross-examination in appropriate cases.

**Applications: form and content**

5.77 The grounds upon which an authorization may be granted are any of the following—the interests of national security,\(^{163}\) for the purpose of preventing or detecting crime or of

---


\(^{151}\) RIPA, s 30(4)(a); and Regulation of Investigatory Powers (Directed Surveillance and Covert Human Intelligence Sources) Order 2010 (SI 2010/521).

\(^{152}\) RIPA, s 30(5).

\(^{153}\) RIPA, s 30(7).

\(^{154}\) RIPA, s 31 generally.


\(^{156}\) RIPA, s 30(3)(a); and Regulation of Investigatory Powers (Directed Surveillance and Covert Human Intelligence Sources) Order 2010 (SI 2010/521).

\(^{157}\) RIPA, s 30(3)(b); detecting crime is the only ground subject to elaboration in the ‘general interpretation’ section of the Act: see s 81(5).

\(^{158}\) Part I of the Schedule to the Order.

\(^{159}\) RIPA, s 28(2)(a); the grounds are set out in s 28(3)(a)—(g).

\(^{160}\) The Code of Practice provides some guidance on necessity and proportionality at paras 3.3–3.7.

\(^{161}\) RIPA, s 28(2)(b).


\(^{163}\) RIPA, s 28(3)(a).
D. Applications for Authorization: Requirements

preventing disorder, the interests of the economic well-being of the United Kingdom, the interests of public safety, for the purpose of protecting public health, for the purpose of assessing or collecting any tax, duty, levy or other imposition, contribution or charge payable to a government department, or for any purpose other than the above which is specified for the purposes of this subsection by any later order made by the Secretary of State which must be laid before parliament and approved by a resolution of each House.

Applications for directed surveillance in national security cases are, in general, the province of the Security Service, whose statutory functions include the protection of national security. The only exceptions are where the operations are carried out by police units with a formal counter-terrorism role (for example, Special Branch, Counter-Terrorism Units, Counter-Terrorist Command) or where the Security Service has agreed that, in the discharge of its functions, another public authority can carry out the surveillance on its behalf. Her Majesty’s forces undertake surveillance in connection with the military threat to national security, in support of the Security Service and, where necessary, the Police Service of Northern Ireland.

Not all public authorities are able to seek authorizations on the available grounds. The National Crime Agency (NCA) can only conduct directed surveillance for the purposes of the prevention or detection of crime or disorder.

The conduct that is authorized by a directed surveillance authorization is the directed surveillance as specified in the authorization provided it is carried out in the circumstances described in the authorization and for the purposes of the investigation or operation specified or described in the authorization. It follows therefore that conduct outside the terms of the authorization falls outside the protection afforded by section 27 (which purports to make such surveillance lawful for all purposes). However section 27(2) may still operate to create immunity from civil suit.

Only designated persons within a police force may grant an authorization under s 28. The same limitation applies in respect of a designated person with NCA, the Scottish Crime and Drug Enforcement Agency and Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs (ie the power to grant an authorization is not transferable as between relevant public authorities). This is also covered in the Code of Practice. It is subject to the new provisions on collaborative policing. These apply if the chief officer or chief constable has made an agreement with the chief officer of police with one or more other police forces or in Scotland a chief constable of one or more other Scottish police forces. Collaborative police force is defined in s 33(1ZC) and in the case of a Scottish police force, s 33(1ZF).

The Chairman of the Office of Fair Trading (OFT) may now grant authorizations but this power to do so is limited to cases involving the prevention and detection of cartel offences under s 188 of the Enterprise Act 2002.

---

164 RIPA, s 28(3)(b).
165 RIPA, s 28(3)(c).
166 RIPA, s 28(3)(d).
167 RIPA, s 28(3)(e).
168 RIPA, s 28(3)(f).
169 RIPA, s 28(3)(g).
170 RIPA, s 28(5).
171 Security Service Act 1989, s 1.
172 Code of Practice, fn 30 summarizes the position.
173 Code of Practice, fn 31 summarizes the position.
174 A matter about which the Chief Surveillance Commissioner has expressed concern in his Report for 2006–2007, paras 10.2–10.3.
175 RIPA, s 28(4)(a).
176 RIPA, s 28(4)(b).
177 RIPA, s 33(1A).
178 RIPA, s 33(1B).
179 RIPA, s 33(2).
180 RIPA, s 33(1).
181 Code of Practice, para 3.20.
182 RIPA, s 33(1ZA) and (1ZD).
183 RIPA, s 33(3A).
184 RIPA, s 33(3A).
5.84 The updated Code of Practice identifies ten matters that need to be covered in an application and it is against this list that authorizations should be checked by authorizing officers, reviewed by the Office for the Surveillance Commissioners on an inspection, or subjected to examination in legal proceedings. It comprises the reasons why the application is necessary and the grounds upon which it is based, the nature of the surveillance engaged in, the identities of the targets, a summary of the intelligence case, the information it is hoped will be acquired as a result of the deployment, an assessment of collateral intrusion and why it is justified in the circumstances, any confidential information at risk of being acquired, an assessment of the proportionality of the proposed operation, the level of authority required and the record of decision and the date and time of this.\textsuperscript{185}

5.85 The Chief Surveillance Officer has emphasized the need for language to be used carefully and precisely, in applications for authorizations.\textsuperscript{186}

5.86 Harfield and Harfield offer investigators the following practical advice:

‘Thus investigators must seek detailed authority for all the conduct they wish to engage in, and authorising officers must ensure that their authorities specify in detail all conduct that they are content to authorise. Where authorising officers authorise more than has been applied for they must state their reasons for doing so. Similarly they must record their reasons for not authorising all or any of the conduct detailed in an application.’\textsuperscript{187}

Urgent cases

5.87 Authorization can be granted or renewed orally in an urgent case or must otherwise be in writing.\textsuperscript{188} It should consider the matters referred to in the preceding paragraph. In typically opaque language, the person’s entitlement to authorize or renew in an urgent case ‘is not confined to urgent cases.’\textsuperscript{189} In his annotation to RIPA, Cape has extrapolated this as meaning that a person entitled to act for a senior authorizing officer in an urgent case who also makes an application must do so in writing.\textsuperscript{190} It is not clear from the section that this is the effect in urgent cases and it is difficult to comprehend why someone with delegated powers to handle urgent cases would then as a consequence of how the section is drafted, be prevented from doing so, other than in writing.

5.88 The term ‘urgent’ is not defined in RIPA but the updated Code of Practice offers the following guidance:

A case is not normally to be regarded as urgent unless the time that would elapse before the authorising officer was available to grant the authorisation would, in the judgment of the person giving the authorisation, be likely to endanger life or jeopardise the investigation or operation for which the authorisation was being given. An authorisation is not to be regarded as urgent where the need for an authorisation has been neglected or the urgency is of the authorising officer’s or applicant’s own making.\textsuperscript{191}

5.89 The record of an urgent application that has been granted should include the identities of the targets, the nature of the surveillance, the reasons why the authorizing officer considered the case sufficiently urgent so as to approve it orally and, where it was not considered

\textsuperscript{185} Code of Practice, para 5.8.
\textsuperscript{188} RIPA, s 43(1).
\textsuperscript{189} RIPA, s 34(f)(a); see also SI 2003/3171, SI 2005/1084, SI 2006/594 and SI 2006/1874.
\textsuperscript{190} Edward Cape, \textit{RIPA 2000, Related SIs and Codes of Practice} (Thomson Sweet & Maxwell, 2005).
\textsuperscript{191} Code of Practice, para 5.6.
by the authorizing officer but an officer entitled to authorize in his or her absence, why it was not reasonably practicable to for the application to be considered by the authorizing officer. 5.90

The authorizing officer should not generally be involved in any operation he or she authorizes but where this is unavoidable, the centrally retrievable record of authorizations should highlight this and it should be brought to the attention of either the Commissioner or Inspector on the next inspection. 5.91

**Duration, renewal, and cancellation**

In cases where authorization is given in writing it lasts for three months, 5.92 or in the case of an authorization granted by an intelligence agency six months. 5.93 An urgent application may be authorized for up to 72 hours 5.94 before it is required to be renewed and if not renewed the authorization ceases to have effect.

A directed surveillance authorization may be renewed for a further period of three months or where it has been granted by one of the intelligence agencies it can be renewed for a further period of six months by an authorizing officer (providing the criteria for granting it continues to exist). An application to renew should not be made until shortly before the authorisation period is drawing to an end or there is a material change in circumstances.

A decision to renew should record as a minimum whether it is the first renewal, or the date and details of every previous renewal, any significant changes to the information since the application for authorization was made, the reasons why it should continue, an assessment of what intelligence has been obtained so far and its value to the operation and the results of any reviews. 5.95

No renewal should be granted unless the authorizing officer is satisfied that a review has been carried out and the results of it considered. 5.96 There are obtuse provisions about the timing of authorizations in section 43(9). It seems that the granting of authorization takes effect on the day of authorization and the renewal on the day the authorization would otherwise have expired. There is no limit to the number of applications for renewals that can be made and approved providing the criteria are met on each occasion and the renewals are centrally recorded.

An authorization must be cancelled if the grounds upon which it was granted are no longer satisfied, although the authorizing officer (or other person entitled) can modify an application on reviewing it so as to cease surveillance against someone no longer of interest or they can stop using a particular tactic that is not effective. Once cancelled, surveillance should cease immediately. The date of cancellation should be centrally recorded and good practice seems to be also to record what was acquired by the surveillance and whether or not the operational objectives were met.

There is a downward trend in the number of directed surveillance authorizations granted by law enforcement agencies. The Chief Surveillance Officer has opined that this may reflect ‘better use of reviews to amend tactics and techniques used’ which was previously ‘over-cautious’. Sir Christopher also issued advice that there was no requirement to cancel and re-issue a new authorization whenever a new tactic or technique was needed, ‘judicious amendment of an existing authorization is compliant with RIPA’. 5.97
The Protection of Freedoms Act 2012: the use of directed surveillance by local authorities

Introduction

5.97 Following the controversy following the case of *Paton v Poole Borough Council*\(^{207}\) the Home Office Review into Counter-Terrorism and Security Powers in 2011\(^{208}\) made a series of recommendations about the use of RIPA by local authorities.\(^{209}\) These included the introduction of judicial approval and a minimum crime threshold. Both were adopted and included within the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 (the 2012 Act), which amends RIPA. The 2012 Act represents a sea change, whether knowingly or not, to the United Kingdom’s position on the notion that judges, not the state, should authorise covert surveillance activities\(^{210}\) and aligns itself with the Strasbourg tenet that ‘it is in principle desirable to entrust supervisory control [of covert surveillance] to a judge’.\(^{211}\)

Approval procedure

5.98 The 2012 Act, which came into force on 1 November 2012, introduces a new section 32A to RIPA. Its application includes local authority\(^{212}\) authorizations under section 28 and 29. Authorization still takes place as it always has under RIPA, but the authorisation does not take effect until such time (if any) as the relevant judicial authority has made an order approving the grant of the authorisation.\(^{213}\) The Regulation of Investigatory Powers (Directed Surveillance and Covert Human Intelligence Sources) Order 2010\(^{214}\) has been amended to provide for a ‘crime threshold’ to applications for directed surveillance. These are criminal offences that attract a maximum custodial sentence of six months or more or criminal offences relating to the underage sale of alcohol or tobacco.

5.99 The relevant judicial authority is a Justice of the Peace (JP).\(^{215}\)

5.100 A JP may grant approval only if he or she is satisfied that the requirements of section 28(2) (necessity and proportionality) have been complied with, any conditions imposed under section 28(7)(b) and ‘the relevant conditions’ have been satisfied both at the time of the grant of the authorization and when he or she is considering the approval.\(^{216}\)

5.101 Relevant conditions are set out in section 32A(4) and include that the individual who granted the authorization was a designated person for the purposes of section 28, the grant was not in breach of any prohibition or restriction imposed by sections 28(2) or 30(3) or any other conditions imposed by the Secretary of State.\(^{217}\)

5.102 The procedure is set out in section 32B. Any person holding an office, rank or position in a local authority in England and Wales and in Northern Ireland a district council in an excepted or reserved matter may make an application for approval.\(^{218}\) There is no

\(^{207}\) IPT/09/01/C, 29 July 2010.
\(^{209}\) Counter-terrorism Review, paras 25–27 (n 123).
\(^{210}\) See *Esbester v United Kingdom* (1994) 18 EHRR CD 72 and *Christie v United Kingdom* 78A DR 118.
\(^{211}\) *Klass v Germany* (1978) 2 EHRR 214, para 56.
\(^{212}\) The definition of a local authority is found in section 32A(7).
\(^{213}\) RIPA, s 32A(2).
\(^{214}\) Protection of Freedoms Act 2012, s 32A(3)(a)–(b).
\(^{215}\) Protection of Freedoms Act 2012, subsection (6)(a)–(c); it includes provision to the conduct of local authorities in Northern Ireland.
\(^{216}\) Protection of Freedoms Act 2012, s 32B(1).
requirement to give notice to any person to whom the application relates or to their legal representatives. If on making the application the JP refuses to approve, he or she may also quash the authorization.

The new provisions are supported by Guidance (‘the Guidance’) and amendments to the Regulation of Investigatory Powers (Directed Surveillance and Covert Human Intelligence Sources) Order 2010. The Guidance sets out the practical procedure for applying for judicial approval, which is straightforward. The first point of contact is with the local magistrates’ court when a request for hearing is made. If the approval is made out of hours, the application must be provided in duplicate so that the JP can retain one of the copies (alternatively, the police may have the power to act). In the case of renewals, it is important to ensure these are prepared ahead of the deadline so that it is not necessary to renew out of hours or during holidays.

The hearing of the application

The hearing is a legal proceeding and the relevant local authority officers will need to appear, be sworn and give their evidence on oath as required by the JP. The hearing is private and heard by a single JP. He or she may have questions to clarify points or require reassurance on certain issues. It is important that the person who attends the hearing is the individual best able to answer any questions, on both the question of policy and the operational detail. The Guidance does not contemplate the attendance of a legal advisor will be necessary.

The JP must consider whether he or she is satisfied both that at the time the authorization was granted and when the application for approval is considered there were and are reasonable grounds that it was and is necessary and proportionate. Any applicable restrictions will need to be considered and the JP must be satisfied these are met before granting approval. The application should be refused if the JP is not satisfied the tests are met. The decision must be recorded on the appropriate form and retained securely. If the JP refuses the application and is considering quashing the authorization, he or she must give the local authority two business days following the refusal to make representations. The application form and form of order are annexed to the Guidance.

A local authority can judicially review a refusal on a point of law or complain to the Magistrates’ Advisory Committee.

Section 80 of RIPA is unaffected by the amendments. The decision of whether to authorize remains with the local authority and the new provisions only apply where a decision to authorize has been taken. However, where the crime threshold is not met but a local authority engages in what would otherwise constitute directed surveillance there is an argument that this may now be ultra vires, although this has not so far been tested.

The Chief Surveillance Commissioner has made some tentative observations about the operation of the 2012 Act. These include, the absence of a requirement that the authorizing officer attends the hearing before the magistrate, the ill-advisedness of a magistrate
indicating peremptorily that he could not envisage circumstances where an authorization would be required by a local authority, the fact that the crime threshold does not apply to covert human intelligence sources, the legitimacy of covert surveillance in cases where the crime threshold is not met, and the cost of investigations where previously covert surveillance was used but where this is no longer possible because the crime threshold is not met.

**Intrusive surveillance**

*Senior authorizing officers*

5.109 Section 32 of RIPA provides, subject to exceptions, that the Secretary of State or senior authorizing officers shall have power to grant authorizations for the carrying out of intrusive surveillance. Senior authorizing officers are listed in section 32(6) and include Chief Constables, Provost Marshalls of each branch of the armed forces and the Director General of the NCA.

5.110 Neither the Secretary of State nor a senior authorizing officer can grant an authorization for the carrying out of intrusive surveillance unless he believes it necessary on grounds provided and it is proportionate to what is sought to be achieved by carrying it out to do so. This requires an assessment to be carried out as to whether the information derived from the conduct to be engaged in could reasonably be obtained by other means.

*Applications: form and content*

5.111 Unlike applications for directed surveillance or use and conduct of covert human intelligence sources, there are only three grounds upon which an intrusive surveillance authorization may be granted. They are the interests of national security, for the purpose of preventing or detecting serious crime, or the interests of the economic well-being of the United Kingdom.

5.112 The conduct that is authorized by an intrusive authorization is any conduct that consists in the carrying out of intrusive surveillance of any such description as is specified in the authorization, is carried out in relation to the residential premises specified or described in the authorization or in relation to the private vehicle so specified or described and is carried out for the purposes of, or in connection with, the investigation or operation so specified or described.

5.113 A senior authorizing officer within a police force, NCA, Scottish Crime and Drug Enforcement Agency, or Revenue and Customs must not grant an authorization for the carrying out of intrusive surveillance except on an application from within their own organizations and where this includes conduct relating to residential premises these are within the area of operation of that organization. The chairman of the OFT must not grant an intrusive surveillance authorization except on an application made by an OFT officer.

---

227 2012–2013 Annual Report, para 5.3.  
228 2012–2013 Annual Report, para 5.4.  
229 2012–2013 Annual Report, para 5.5.  
231 RIPA, s 32(1).  
232 RIPA, s 32(2)(a)–(b).  
233 RIPA, s 32(4).  
234 RIPA, s 32(3)(a).  
235 RIPA, s 32(3)(b).  
236 RIPA, s 32(3)(c).  
237 RIPA, s 32(5)(a).  
238 RIPA, s 32(5)(b).  
239 RIPA, s 32(5)(c).  
240 Defined in RIPA, s 33(5A) in respect of England and Wales and s 33(5B) in respect of Scotland.  
241 RIPA, s 33 (3), (1A), (1B), and (4) respectively.  
242 RIPA, s 33(6) generally.  
243 RIPA, s 33(4A).
D. Applications for Authorization: Requirements

There is guidance provided in the updated Code of Practice under the heading ‘collaborative working’. Again, there are exceptions where it is a collaborative force that proposes to conduct the surveillance. These apply if the chief officer or chief constable has made an agreement with the chief officer of police with one or more other police forces or in Scotland a chief constable of one or more other Scottish police forces. Collaborative police force is defined in s 33(3ZC) and in the case of a Scottish police force, s 33(3ZF). The senior authorizing officer may grant the application only in relation to premises in the area, which is the area of operation of a collaborative force and specified in relation to members of that force, in the collaborative agreement.

It is permissible for one authorization to combine both an intrusive surveillance authorization made by or on the application of an individual who is a member of a police force, the NCA, the Scottish Crime and Drug Enforcement Agency, or who is a customs officer or the chairman or an officer of the OFT and an authorization given by, or on the application of, that individual under Part III of the Police Act 1997. Where a combined authorization is sought the applicable provisions of both RIPA and the Police Act 1997 apply to the respective aspects of the authorization.

Where the authorizing officer or designated deputy within a police force, NCA, or Revenue and Customs is unavailable (section 34 defines unavailable as being ‘not reasonably practicable, having regard to the urgency of the case, for the application to be considered by any person who is a senior authorising officer’, the term ‘reasonably practicable’ is elaborated upon in the Code of Practice at footnote 43 and includes absence on leave but is likely to exclude pressure of work) and the request for authorization is urgent, the application can be made to and considered by any person listed in section 34(4).

A person who considers an application in the absence of the authorizing officer or his or her designated deputy has the same power to grant an authorization as the person for whom he or she is entitled to act.

Notification requirements

Any authorization or cancellation by the police, Revenue and Customs and the OFT must be notified as soon as reasonably practicable to what is referred to as ‘an ordinary Surveillance Commissioner’ (this means a Commissioner other than the Chief Surveillance Commissioner). The obligation to do so is the responsibility of the person granting or cancelling the authorization.

There are a number of notification requirements. It must be given in writing (but can be transmitted electronically) as soon as reasonably practicable after the grant or, as the case may be, cancellation of the authorization to which it relates, it must be given in accordance with any such arrangements made for the purposes of this paragraph by the Chief Surveillance Commissioner as are for the time being in force, and it must specify

---

244 Code of Practice, paras 3.15–3.21 and paras 6.9–6.10.
245 RIPA, s 33(3ZA) and (3ZD), respectively.
246 RIPA, s 33(3ZB) and (3ZE), respectively.
247 RIPA, s 33(5).
248 RIPA, s 34(2). 249 RIPA, s 34(2).
249 See Code of Practice, para 6.5. 250 Defined in RIPA, s 34(6).
251 RIPA, s 34(3).
252 The usual definitions extend to the references to police, NCA, Revenue and Customs officers, the OFT, and to those officers who grant or cancel authorizations in the absence of the senior authorizing officer and his or her deputy: RIPA, s 35(10).
253 RIPA, s 35(1). 254 RIPA, s 81(1).
255 RIPA, s 35(2)(a). 256 RIPA, s 35(1).
257 RIPA, s 35(9).
Chapter 5: Surveillance

such matters as the Secretary of State may by later Order prescribe\(^{260}\) (the usual provision is made that no Order can be made unless a draft of the Order has been laid before Parliament and approved by a resolution of each House: section 35(5). This is subject to an exception in section 35(6) that it does not apply to the first Order made. Under section 35(7) this Order must be approved by both Houses within 40 days or it will cease to have effect).\(^{261}\) The arrangements can be found in the Regulation of Investigatory Powers (Notification of Authorisations etc) Order 2000.\(^{262}\)

5.120 A notice must either state that the approval of a Surveillance Commissioner is required by section 36 before the grant of the authorization will take effect\(^{263}\) or state that the case is one of urgency and set out the grounds on which the case is believed to be one of urgency.\(^{264}\)

Urgent cases

5.121 An urgent case is subject to the same criteria as in cases of directed surveillance (risk of danger to life, etc).\(^{265}\) The updated Code of Practice makes it clear that the provisions in relation to urgent applications should not be used routinely.\(^{266}\) If the senior authorizing officer or his or her designated deputy is not available, an authorization may be granted by a person entitled to act in urgent cases. In police forces out of hours officers of assistant Chief Constable rank or above are entitled to act in this capacity.\(^{267}\) The decision to grant an authority in an urgent case must be recorded in writing by the person who applied for it as soon as reasonably practicable.\(^{268}\) It takes effect from the time it is granted providing proper notice is given to the Surveillance Commissioner.\(^{269}\)

5.122 Where a case becomes urgent after approval has been sought, the authorizing officer should notify the Surveillance Commissioner that the case is urgent and the authorization will take effect immediately.\(^{270}\) The updated Code of Practice is ambiguous on whether it takes effect on notification to the Surveillance Commissioner or once the authorizing officer determines it is in fact an urgent case. The legislation presumably prevails and the latter interpretation is correct since the senior authorizing officer retains the statutory power to grant an urgent authorization if the criteria are met.

5.123 During the reporting period 2012–2013, there was a significant increase in the use of the urgency provisions, which had more than doubled from the previous year to 976 occasions. This will be the subject of review in the coming reporting period.\(^{271}\)

Role of the Surveillance Commissioner

5.124 There are obligations on the Surveillance Commissioner who receives a notice that an intrusive surveillance authorization has been granted. He or she must, as soon as practicable, scrutinize the authorization\(^{272}\) and in a case where notice has been given that approval is required before the authorization will take effect, decide whether or not to approve the authorization.\(^{273}\)

5.125 Where an authorization for the carrying out of intrusive surveillance has been granted on the application of a member of a police force, NCA, Revenue and Customs officer or an officer of the OFT\(^{274}\), the authorization does not take effect until such time (if any) as it has been approved by an ordinary Surveillance Commissioner\(^{275}\) and written notice of this has

\(^{260}\) RIPA, s 35(2)(c).
\(^{261}\) See also RIPA, s 35(8).
\(^{262}\) SI 2000/2563.
\(^{263}\) RIPA, s 35(3)(a).
\(^{264}\) RIPA, s 35(3)(b).
\(^{265}\) See para 5.77.
\(^{266}\) Code of Practice, para 6.15.
\(^{267}\) Code of Practice, para 6.7.
\(^{268}\) Code of Practice, para 6.6.
\(^{269}\) Code of Practice, para 6.12.
\(^{270}\) Code of Practice, para 6.13.
\(^{271}\) 2012–2013 Annual Report, para 4.5.
\(^{272}\) RIPA, s 35(6)(a).
\(^{273}\) RIPA, s 35(6)(b).
\(^{274}\) RIPA, s 36(1).
\(^{275}\) RIPA, s 36(2)(a).
been given to the person who granted the authorization.\footnote{RIPA, s 36(2)(b).} The updated Code of Practice states that it ‘will not take effect until the notice has been received in the office of the person who granted the authorization’,\footnote{Code of Practice, para 6.11.} although this seems an overly zealous interpretation of RIPA and unlikely to bind the courts if the senior authorizing officer happens to receive notice of approval somewhere other than in his or her office. This does not apply to urgent cases providing the provisions relating to urgent cases have been complied with.\footnote{RIPA, s 36(3).}

The Surveillance Commissioner can only give his approval to the grant of authorization if, and only if, he is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that it is necessary and proportionate to do so.\footnote{RIPA, s 36(4)(a); the Commissioner must be satisfied s 32(2)(a) and (b) has been met.} Written notice of the Commissioner’s decision should be given to the person who granted the authorization as soon as reasonably practicable.\footnote{RIPA, s 36(4)(b).} Any notice can be provided electronically.\footnote{RIPA, s 36(8).}

If the Surveillance Commissioner decides not to approve an authorization he or she must make a report of his findings to the most senior relevant person within the organization who sought it. The most senior relevant person is defined in section 36(6) and their deputies in (7).

Where an intrusive surveillance authorization has been granted on the application of a member of a police force, NCA, Revenue and Customs officer or OFT officer,\footnote{RIPA, s 37(1).} and a Surveillance Commissioner is at the time or later satisfied that at the time when the authorization was granted or at any time when it was renewed there were no reasonable grounds for believing that it was neither necessary nor proportionate, he or she may quash the authorization with effect, as he thinks fit, from the time of the grant of the authorization or from the time of any renewal of the authorization.\footnote{RIPA, s 37(2).}

If a Surveillance Commissioner is satisfied at any time while the authorization is in force that there are no longer any reasonable grounds for believing that it was necessary and proportionate, he may cancel the authorization with effect from the time when the basis for its being granted ceased to exist.\footnote{RIPA, s 37(3).} Those who drafted RIPA have found it necessary to specify that in these circumstances, the Surveillance Commissioner does not have to give notice of cancellation to his or her own office.\footnote{RIPA, s 37(10).}

Where an urgent authorization has been granted and the appropriate notice has been given,\footnote{In accordance with RIPA, s 35(3)(b).} the Surveillance Commissioner may quash the authorization from the time of the grant of the authorization or from the time of any renewal of the authorization, if he or she is satisfied that at the time of the grant or renewal of the authorization there were no reasonable grounds for believing that the case was one of urgency.\footnote{RIPA, s 37(9)(a).} Providing any records relating to the authorization are not required for either civil or criminal proceedings, the Surveillance Commissioner may also order their destruction in part or full.\footnote{RIPA, s 37(9)(b).} A similar power to order destruction of records exists in respect of an authorization that has ceased to have effect and where the Commissioner concludes that for some of the time whilst it was in force, grounds did not exist for the granting of the authorization.\footnote{RIPA, s 37(7).} No order can be made whilst either civil or criminal proceedings are pending.\footnote{RIPA, s 37(6).} No destruction can take place until the period for appealing has expired\footnote{RIPA, s 37(9)(a).} or any appeal has been later dismissed by the Chief Surveillance Officer.\footnote{RIPA, s 37(9)(b).}
Chapter 5: Surveillance

Quashing authorizations and appeals

5.131 There are reporting requirements imposed on the Surveillance Commissioner exercising the power to quash authorizations who must as soon as reasonably practicable make a report of his exercise of that power, and of his reasons for doing so.293 These must be sent to the most senior relevant person294 and to the Chief Surveillance Commissioner.295 Where an authorization is quashed or cancelled by a Surveillance Commissioner those involved in the operation must be instructed immediately to cease carrying out the surveillance. The date and time the instruction is given must be recorded and retained for at least three years.296 In 2012–2013, one authorization was quashed by a Commissioner.297

5.132 A senior authorizing officer may appeal to the Chief Surveillance Commissioner against a refusal of a Surveillance Commissioner to approve an authorization for the carrying out of intrusive surveillance,298 a decision of such a Commissioner to quash or cancel such an authorization,299 and/or a decision of such a Commissioner to make an order under section 37 for the destruction of records.300 The right to appeal extends to persons entitled to act for a senior authorizing officer.301

5.133 Any appeal must be brought within the period of seven days beginning with the day on which the refusal or decision appealed against is reported to the appellant.302

5.134 The Chief Surveillance Commissioner must allow an appeal if he or she is satisfied that there were reasonable grounds for believing that the authorization was necessary and proportionate303 and was properly urgent304 at the time it was granted and he or she is not satisfied that the authorization is one of which notice was given in accordance with section 35(3)(b) without there being any reasonable grounds for believing that the case was one of urgency. Where the appeal is allowed the Chief Surveillance Commissioner must also quash any related order for the destruction of records.305

5.135 Even if the Chief Surveillance Officer dismisses an appeal he or she may modify the Commissioner’s decision to quash or cancel the authorization, and any related decision for the destruction of records. To do so he or she must be satisfied that grounds exist to justify the quashing or cancellation of the authorization but that it should have been quashed or cancelled from a different time from that from which it was quashed or cancelled by the Ordinary Surveillance Commissioner.306

5.136 Notice of the determination of an appeal must be provided by the Chief Surveillance Commissioner to the person who brought the appeal and the Surveillance Commissioner who made the decision appealed against.307 If the appeal is dismissed, a report must, in addition, be made to the Prime Minister.308 No reasons must be given other than notification in any report and any matters that may be prejudicial to the prevention and detection of serious crime must also be excluded pursuant to section 107(3) and (4) of the Police Act 1997.309

5.137 Every member of a police force, NCA, Revenue and Customs, and officer of the OFT must comply with any request of a Surveillance Commissioner for documents or information required by that Commissioner for the purpose of enabling him or her to carry out his or her functions.310

---

293 RIPA, s 37(8).
294 RIPA, s 37(8)(a); within the meaning of s 36(6).
295 RIPA, s 37(8)(b).
296 Code of Practice, para 6.35.
298 RIPA, s 38(1)(a).
299 RIPA, s 38(1)(b).
300 RIPA, s 38(1)(c).
301 RIPA, s 38(2); the relevant provisions are set in s 34(6).
302 RIPA, s 38(3).
303 RIPA, s 38(4)(a); the grounds are set out in s 32(2)(a) and (b).
304 RIPA, s 38(4)(b).
305 RIPA, s 38(5).
306 RIPA, s 38(6).
307 RIPA, s 39(1)(a)–(b).
308 RIPA, s 39(2)(b).
309 RIPA, s 39(3) and (4).
310 RIPA, s 40.
Applications by the intelligence agencies, the Ministry of Defence, and Her Majesty’s forces

The authorization regime for the intelligence agencies, the Ministry of Defence and Her Majesty’s forces and any other designated public authority is different. Applications for authorization are made to the Secretary of State and do not need the approval of the Surveillance Commissioner. Section 32 (the grounds and basis upon which authority may be granted) applies to the Ministry of Defence and Her Majesty’s forces other than the grounds upon which authorization may be granted by either organization are limited to the interests of national security and the prevention and detection of serious crime.

Where an intelligence agency applies for an authorization which is granted it must be by way of a ministerial warrant. This can combine an intrusive surveillance authorization and a warrant issued under the Intelligence Services Act 1994 (property interference) but the two legislative regimes must be considered and applied separately in relation to the appropriate parts of the application before the Secretary of State.

Applications by the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS or MI6) or GCHQ for an intrusive surveillance warrant may only be granted on the basis that it is necessary in the interests of national security or the economic well-being of the United Kingdom, unless either are acting in support of a law enforcement agency in relation to the prevention and detection of serious crime.

The functions of the Security Service (MI5) are extended by section 42 of RIPA. Providing it is acting within powers exercisable by SIS or GCHQ other than anything done in support of the prevention and detection of serious crime, it may act on either agency’s behalf in relation to any application for a Part II authority (ie not limited to intrusive surveillance) and if granted, carrying out the conduct authorized.

All applications must provide, as a minimum, the information listed in the Code of Practice. This consists of the reasons why the authorization is necessary and the grounds upon which it is made, the nature of the surveillance, the residential premises or private vehicle if known, in relation to where surveillance is to take place, the identities of the targets of the surveillance if known, a description of the information it is hoped will be acquired, an assessment of collateral intrusion and its justification, details of any confidential information likely to be acquired and an assessment of the proportionality of the operation. A record of the decision and the date and time it was reached should be made and kept in relation to each application.

If the case is urgent, in addition to the information required in the preceding paragraph which may be given orally, certain information must be recorded as soon as reasonably practicable including, the identities of the targets of the surveillance if known, the nature and location of the proposed surveillance, the reasons why the authorizing officer or the officer entitled to act considered the case appropriate to be treated as urgent and the reasons why it was not reasonably practicable for it to be considered by the authorizing officer.

---

311 But excluding, in relation to the Ministry of Defence and Her Majesty’s forces, their respective police forces who are governed by the provisions in relation to police forces.
312 The provisions relating to designated public authorities are found in RIPA, s 41(4)–(6).
313 RIPA, s 32(3).
314 RIPA, s 42(1).
315 See generally Chapter 6, Property Interference, in this volume.
316 RIPA, s 42(2).
317 RIPA, s 42(3).
318 RIPA, s 42(5).
319 RIPA, s 42(4).
320 Code of Practice, para 6.19.
321 Code of Practice, para 6.20.
**Chapter 5: Surveillance**

### Duration, renewal, and cancellation

**5.144** An authorization may be granted or renewed orally in urgent cases\(^ {322}\) or otherwise must be granted in writing.\(^ {323}\) If an urgent authorization is granted orally, a record that the authorizing officer has expressly authorized must be kept by him or her and by the applicant.

**5.145** If it is a combined application the separate provisions within RIPA must be considered as appropriate to those aspects of the application to which they relate.\(^ {324}\)

**5.146** In general an authorization that was granted or renewed on the basis that it was urgent will cease to have effect after 72 hours from the time of granting or renewing it if it has not been renewed by someone with the authority to do so or was last renewed orally by such a person.\(^ {325}\) This is subject to a series of qualifications that appear in subsections and subsubsections of section 43 of RIPA.

**5.147** Where the case is not urgent and relates to an authorization for the use and conduct of a covert human intelligence source, the authority will cease to have effect after a period of 12 months.\(^ {326}\) In the case of directed and intrusive surveillance authorizations that are not urgent, the authority will cease to have effect after a period of three months from the date it was granted or if renewed from the date of latest renewal.\(^ {327}\) There are different time periods for cases requiring Ministerial warrants involving the intelligence agencies.

**5.148** The first qualification, itself subject to qualification (but in respect of covert human intelligence sources, so outside the scope of this chapter),\(^ {328}\) is that the authorization may be renewed before it ceases to have effect by someone entitled to grant it.\(^ {329}\) Renewals are, naturally, subject to the same provisions (sections 28–41 of RIPA) that applied to the substantive authorization.\(^ {330}\)

**5.149** The second qualification is that the Secretary of State may by order later provide a different time period within which authorizations cease to have effect.\(^ {331}\)

**5.150** The time of the commencement of an authorization is dealt with in section 43(9). Other than cases where authorization requires prior approval in writing of a Surveillance Commissioner,\(^ {332}\) an authorization takes effect on the day it was granted at the time it was granted\(^ {333}\) and a renewal the day the authorization would have ceased to have effect but for the renewal.\(^ {334}\) Where the authorization or renewal requires prior approval from a Surveillance Commissioner it takes effect on the day and at the time it is approved and written notice has been given to the person who granted the authorization.\(^ {335}\)

**5.151** There are special rules over and above those covered above in relation to authorities granted by or warrants issued to the intelligence agencies.\(^ {336}\) Only the Secretary of State or in cases where the warrant has been issued by Scottish ministers, a member of the Scottish Government can issue or renew a warrant containing an intrusive surveillance authorization.\(^ {337}\) Where the Secretary of State or Scottish ministers has or have expressly authorized the issue of a warrant in urgent cases, it may be issued (but not renewed) by a senior official.\(^ {338}\)

In such circumstances if it is not renewed the warrant will cease to have effect at the end

---

\(^ {322}\) RIPA, s 43(1)(a); note that the person who grants or renews it must be entitled to do so in cases other than urgent cases, although the reasons for this are confusing.

\(^ {323}\) RIPA, s 43(1)(b).

\(^ {324}\) RIPA, s 43(2).

\(^ {325}\) RIPA, s 43(3)(a).

\(^ {326}\) RIPA, s 43(3)(b); see also Chapter 7, Covert Human Intelligence Sources, in this volume.

\(^ {327}\) RIPA, s 43(3)(c).

\(^ {328}\) See Chapter 7, Covert Human Intelligence Sources, in this volume.

\(^ {329}\) RIPA, s 43(4).

\(^ {330}\) RIPA, s 43(5).

\(^ {331}\) RIPA, s 43(8).

\(^ {332}\) RIPA, s 43(9)(a); see s 36(2).

\(^ {333}\) RIPA, s 43(9)(a).

\(^ {334}\) RIPA, s 43(9)(b).

\(^ {335}\) RIPA, s 43(9)(c).

\(^ {336}\) RIPA, s 43(10).

\(^ {337}\) RIPA, s 44(1).

\(^ {338}\) RIPA, s 44(2).
of the second working day following the day of issue\(^\text{339}\) (as opposed to the 72 hours in other cases).\(^\text{340}\)

A warrant that has not been renewed ceases to have effect after a period of six months beginning with the day it was issued.\(^\text{341}\) Where renewed, at the end of the period of six months beginning with the day on which it would have ceased to have effect if not renewed again,\(^\text{342}\) The same time periods apply to directed surveillance. Any renewal must be endorsed by the person entitled to renew confirming that he or she believes that the, or one of the grounds upon which it was granted continues to exist.\(^\text{343}\) A warrant for this purpose includes a combined authorization to carry out directed and intrusive surveillance.\(^\text{344}\)

Any applications for renewal must include details of any previous renewals, any significant changes to the facts upon which the original application was based, the reasons why it is necessary to continue with the surveillance, an assessment of the content and value of the intelligence gathered so far and the results of any review.\(^\text{345}\) There is no limit on the number of renewals providing the criteria are met.\(^\text{346}\)

The Secretary of State may by Order change the periods of time within which an authorization may cease to have effect.\(^\text{347}\)

An authorization or renewal must be cancelled by the person who granted or renewed it (or a person entitled to act or that person’s deputy)\(^\text{348}\) if he or she is satisfied that the requirements which were met when it was granted or renewed are no longer satisfied.\(^\text{349}\) The Secretary of State is empowered to make regulations to provide for the procedure to be adopted where the person is no longer available.\(^\text{350}\) Once an authority has been cancelled instruction should be given to those involved to stop carrying out the surveillance. The date the authorization was cancelled should be centrally recorded and the documentation retained.\(^\text{351}\) The Surveillance Commissioner must be notified of the cancellation.\(^\text{352}\)

There are restrictions that apply to conduct that may take place in Scotland. No authorization or renewal can be granted unless it relates to the protection of national security or the economic well-being of the United Kingdom\(^\text{353}\) and all of the conduct authorized is likely to take place in Scotland.\(^\text{354}\) The public authorities capable of doing so are set out in section 46(3) and include the intelligence services, the Ministry of Defence and Ministry of Defence Police, the Civil Nuclear Constabulary, the OFT, Revenue and Customs, Her Majesty’s forces, and the British Transport Police. Otherwise the Regulation of Investigatory Powers (Scotland) Act 2000 applies.

The Secretary of State is empowered to modify the descriptions of what may amount to surveillance that is neither directed nor intrusive surveillance or provide that any description of directed surveillance to be treated for the purposes of this Part as intrusive surveillance by Order that can only be made under this section unless a draft of it has been laid before Parliament and approved by a resolution of each House.\(^\text{355}\)

---

\(^\text{339}\) RIPA, s 44(3).
\(^\text{340}\) RIPA, s 44(3).
\(^\text{341}\) RIPA, s 44(4)(a).
\(^\text{342}\) RIPA, s 44(4)(b).
\(^\text{343}\) RIPA, s 44(5)(a)–(b).
\(^\text{344}\) RIPA, s 44(7).
\(^\text{345}\) Code of Practice, para 6.30.
\(^\text{346}\) Code of Practice, para 6.31.
\(^\text{347}\) RIPA, s 44(6).
\(^\text{348}\) RIPA, s 45(2)(a)–(b); the list of such persons is set out in s 45(6).
\(^\text{349}\) RIPA, s 45(1)(a)–(b).
\(^\text{350}\) RIPA, s 45(4).
\(^\text{351}\) Code of Practice, para 6.33.
\(^\text{352}\) Code of Practice, para 6.34.
\(^\text{353}\) This provision is cryptically set out in the Code of Practice, s 46(2) and seeks to limit the activity in Scotland of those public authorities acting other than on these grounds.
\(^\text{354}\) RIPA, s 46(1)(a)–(b).
\(^\text{355}\) RIPA, s 47.
Common errors relating to the authorization process

The Chief Surveillance Commissioner had reported a number of common procedure and documentation errors:

Too many tactics requested are unused. Authorizing officers and senior responsible officers should monitor whether applicants are lazily requesting tactics out of habit rather than necessity.

...Too many cancellations provide an insufficient record of surveillance actually conducted and the details of collateral intrusion. Rarely does guidance on the retention or destruction of product go beyond an inadequate reference to policy. It is vital that surveillance product that does not match the objectives stated in the authorization is not retained on databases.\textsuperscript{356}

Common errors identified by the Courts have included a failure to authorize,\textsuperscript{357} a failure to authorize different forms of surveillance where this will take place (eg visual as well as audio), invalid authorization for want of adequate detail\textsuperscript{359} (failure to specify the grounds on which it was necessary and proportionate and to provide specific description of conduct to be authorized), a failure to consider collateral intrusion,\textsuperscript{360} seeking authorization or failing to cancel an authorization after the passing of key dates (such as, for example, a decision not to prosecute\textsuperscript{361}) and exceeding the parameters of the authorization.\textsuperscript{362} None resulted in the evidence being excluded although in two of these cases the IPT held that there had been non-compliance with RIPA. Where a challenged is made, the authorization itself will be the focus of argument.\textsuperscript{363} There is unlikely to be any reason why authorizations cannot be disclosed, suitably redacted if necessary.\textsuperscript{364}

E. Other Matters Relating to Authorization

Record-keeping

There is guidance as to the retention of records. Every public authority must maintain a centrally retrievable record of directed and intrusive authorizations for a period of at least three years from the time at which an authorization ceases to have effect. The record must be made available to the Office of the Surveillance Commissioner on request. The record should contain the type and date of authorization, the name and rank of the authorizing officer, and whether he was directly involved in the operation, the unique reference number, the operational name and a brief description of the targets if known, whether the authorization was treated as urgent and if so why, details of any renewals, whether confidential information was acquired and the date on which the authorization was cancelled.\textsuperscript{365}

In addition there is a requirement to retain documentation, including the application and authorization and any subsequent related documentation, a record of the period in which

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{356} 2012–2013 Annual Report, paras 5.14–5.15.
\item \textsuperscript{357} Henderson and Marnoch v Her Majesty’s Advocate 2005 SLT 429.
\item \textsuperscript{358} R v Button and Tannahill [2005] EWCA 516.
\item \textsuperscript{359} R v Gilchrist and Quinn (unreported), Appeal Court, High Court of Justiciary, Appeal Nos X313/04 and X314/04, 24 August 2004.
\item \textsuperscript{360} Paton v Poole Borough Council, IPT/09/01, 6 November 2009.
\item \textsuperscript{361} N v Policier, IPT/07022/CH, 2 December 2009.
\item \textsuperscript{362} R v Harmes and Crane [2006] EWHC Crim 928 and Khan and others v R [2013] EWCA Crim 2230.
\item \textsuperscript{363} Gordon Nardell QC, ‘Keeping an eye on directed surveillance: Paton v Poole Borough Council’ [2012] Covert Policing Review 27.
\item \textsuperscript{364} R v Palmer [2014] EWCA Crim 1681.
\item \textsuperscript{365} Code of Practice, para 8.1.
\end{itemize}
surveillance took place, the number of reviews as prescribed by the authorizing officer and the record of any reviews that took place, any renewal and supporting documentation, the date and time when surveillance ceased as well as the date and time of any other instruction given by the authorizing officer.\textsuperscript{366}

The public authority must also ensure there are arrangements for the secure handling, storage, and, where appropriate, destruction of the product of directed and intrusive surveillance deployments. The intelligence agencies must ensure that arrangements exist that ensure no information is held other than is necessary for the discharge of their statutory functions.\textsuperscript{367}

The Data Protection Act 1998 (DPA)\textsuperscript{368} and Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996 apply.\textsuperscript{369} Material obtained through the deployment of directed or intrusive resources may be used in connection with other investigations.\textsuperscript{370}

**Special circumstances arising during the authorization process**

*Legal professional privilege*

There are a number of circumstances that need to be considered in relation to the use of covert surveillance resources, principally the potential or actual acquisition of confidential and privileged material.

The issue of privilege in the context of covert policing operations generally is discussed further in Chapter 9.

RIPA makes no provision for the acquisition of privileged material and the House of Lords has recently interpreted this as permissive,\textsuperscript{371} although on appeal to the European Court of Human Rights it has communicated the case to the government.\textsuperscript{372} The Code of Practice emphasizes that ‘particular care’ should be taken in cases which it categorizes as involving a high degree of privacy or where the acquisition of confidential material, defined as including legal and journalistic privilege and confidential personal information may be at stake.\textsuperscript{373}

Legal professional privilege is given the definition set out in section 98 of the Police Act 1997, or in Scotland the definition contained in section 33 of the Criminal Law (Consolidation) (Scotland) Act 1995. In Northern Ireland the definition is the same as that provided for in Article 12 of the Police and Criminal Evidence (Northern Ireland) Order 1989.

This is an unfortunate or careless use of the English language; the activities of public authorities engaging in the use of any of the covert resources available to them under RIPA deserve particular care being exercised in relation to their use. Assuming compliance with the Act and the Code of Practice, the issue in the present context is one of proportionality. Where confidential material is likely to be acquired a higher level of authority is required.\textsuperscript{374} Following Re McE\textsuperscript{375} the level of authorization in such cases ought to be the same as intrusive surveillance, although at the time the case was heard by the Supreme Court the appropriate Order had yet to be placed before Parliament. This was the subject of some criticism in Re McE.\textsuperscript{376}

The Regulation of Investigatory Powers (Extension of Authorisation Provisions: Legal Consultations) Order 2010 gives effect to the decision in Re McE.\textsuperscript{376} In summary, directed

\textsuperscript{366} Code of Practice, para 8.2. \textsuperscript{367} Code of Practice, para 9.7. \textsuperscript{368} Code of Practice, para 9.3. \textsuperscript{369} Code of Practice, para 9.5. \textsuperscript{370} Code of Practice, para 9.5. \textsuperscript{371} Re McE [2009] UKHL 15. \textsuperscript{372} RE v The United Kingdom [2013] ECHR 852. \textsuperscript{373} Code of Practice, para 9.4 and 9.6. \textsuperscript{374} Code of Practice, para 9.5. \textsuperscript{375} RE v The United Kingdom [2009] UKHL 15. \textsuperscript{376} Code of Practice, 81. \textsuperscript{377} Set out in Annex A of the Code of Practice. \textsuperscript{378} [2009] UKHL 15.
surveillance that is likely to capture the content of legal consultations must be treated for the purposes of Part II of RIPA as intrusive surveillance.

5.168 Legal consultation is a narrower concept than legal privilege, a matter that is likely to cause confusion to an already confused area of the law. It is defined as:

(a) a consultation between a professional legal adviser and his client or any person representing his client; or
(b) a consultation between a professional legal adviser or his client or any such representative and a medical practitioner made in connection with or in contemplation of legal proceedings and for the purposes of such proceedings. 377

5.169 If this is not problematic enough, there is no distinction between consultations that may be wholly or partly protected by legal privilege and those which take place in the furtherance of a criminal purpose (and therefore matters that would not attract the protection of privilege, such as it is now after Re McE). 378 This is an extraordinary position which at least in theory could lead to a large number of consultations taking place that are covertly recorded but where nothing of relevance is obtained. The material in such circumstances remains privileged (as the Code of Practice accepts) 379 and the risk that investigating teams may come into possession of material that they should not have is significantly increased. Where it does, the implications are potentially catastrophic. This can be illustrated by reference to actual cases. In R v Sutherland 380 police had installed listening devices at two police stations in Lincolnshire. Contrary to the terms of the authorizations, the devices were installed in the exercise yards where it was accepted that it was common practice for solicitors to hold consultations with their clients, since this was the only place they could smoke. Consequently, the risk of picking up conversations attracting legal professional privilege was high and in fact occurred. The authorizations expressly stated that the risk of picking up confidential material was low. After a lengthy voir dire, Newman J concluded that officers had been dishonest in the deployment, dissemination and retention of the privileged material obtained. An indictment containing counts of murder and conspiracy to murder was stayed. In a later case emanating from the same area and where the same officers were involved, the rationale of the trial judge was approved by the Court of Appeal in R v Grant 381 but questioned by the Privy Council in Warren v Attorney General for the Bailiwick of Jersey. 382

5.170 The decision in Re McE did not consider Grant and, as is discussed in Chapter 9, it is difficult to reconcile the two decisions. Nor did it consider other authorities of relevance. In R v Robinson 384 for example, the Court of Appeal considered the propriety of the police using solicitors or their clerks as sources. In this case, which related to significant and widespread legal aid fraud by a solicitor and where the police had used an employee of the firm as a source, the court reiterated the sanctity of legal privilege by relying on the dicta of Lord Bingham of Cornhill in R (Daly) v Secretary of State for the Home Department: 385

Among the rights which, in part at least, survive are three important rights, closely related but free-standing, each of them calling for appropriate legal protection: the right of access to a court; the right of access to legal advice; and the right to communicate confidentially with a legal adviser under the seal of legal professional privilege. Such rights may be

---

377 Code of Practice, para 4.6.
379 Code of Practice, para 4.9.
curtailed only by clear and express words, and then only to the extent reasonably necessary to meet the ends which justify curtailment.\textsuperscript{386}

The court then considered it a serious breach of legal privilege by the solicitor or his clerk and, if encouraged by the police, an infringement of a defendant’s or suspect’s rights if they were committed or were induced to commit the breach. The Crown did not resist the lack of integrity that surrounded the practice but the Chief Constable of Gloucestershire Police intervening (at the court’s invitation) relied on the then Code of Practice in relation to the conduct and use of covert human intelligence sources. At paragraph 3.5 the Code stated:

The 2000 Act does not provide any special protection for legally privileged information. Nevertheless, such information is particularly sensitive and any source which acquires such material may engage article 6 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (the right to a fair trial) as well as article 8.

The Court in Robinson\textsuperscript{387} expressed concern about the use of covert human intelligence sources in this area. It received reassurance from the Chief Constable’s counsel that the references to Daly were kept in mind and that the risk assessments carried out were ‘fraught with danger’. It emphasized the need for members of the public to be able to obtain legal advice without the danger that these confidential communications would pass between their lawyers and the police. It also recognized that privilege did not extend ‘to communications made with the intention of furthering a criminal purpose’\textsuperscript{388} and that decisions to deploy sources in this area would be difficult ones.

Moreover, the decision in Re McE\textsuperscript{389} is clearly incompatible with Strasbourg jurisprudence on the issue.\textsuperscript{390} In Kopp v Switzerland\textsuperscript{391} a lawyer’s telephone communications were intercepted on the basis that he had contact with the subjects of the investigation. The Court held that the law in Switzerland did not make it clear how legal professional privilege was protected in practice. The current position in this jurisdiction is now significantly worse being both confusing and arguably representing no protection at all. A challenge to Strasbourg seems as likely as the outcome predictable unless the Supreme Court is prepared to revisit the issue. However, at the time of writing, the position remains as set out in the Code of Practice.

The updated Code of Practice provides details of what it describes as the ‘tests to be applied when authorising covert surveillance…likely or intended to result in the acquisition of knowledge of matters subject to legal privilege’.\textsuperscript{392} No test is in fact set out, rather there is a series of four requirements. First, any application that if granted is likely to result in the acquisition of privileged material should specify whether this is intentional.\textsuperscript{393} If it is likely but not intentional (and therefore arguably still intentional) then the application should set out the steps that will be taken to mitigate the risks of acquiring it and how it will be handled if still acquired (ie how it will be ensured that anyone connected to the investigation or prosecutor does not have access to it).\textsuperscript{394} Thirdly, if the acquisition of the material is intentional, the authorizing officer, Surveillance Commissioner or Secretary of State must be satisfied there are exceptional and compelling circumstances that make it necessary to do so.\textsuperscript{395} Fourthly, they must also believe it is proportionate to what is sought to be achieved.\textsuperscript{396}

\textsuperscript{386} R (Daley) v Secretary of State [2001] 2 AC 532, paras 537–8.
\textsuperscript{387} The Times, 13 November 2002.
\textsuperscript{388} Former Code of Practice, para 3.4.
\textsuperscript{389} [2009] UKHL 15.
\textsuperscript{390} See, by way of one example, S v Switzerland (1991) 14 EHRR 667, ECtHR.
\textsuperscript{391} (1998) 27 EHRR 91.
\textsuperscript{392} Code of Practice, para 4.10.
\textsuperscript{393} Code of Practice, para 4.11.
\textsuperscript{394} Code of Practice, para 4.12.
\textsuperscript{395} Code of Practice, para 4.13.
Interestingly, ‘exceptional’ and ‘compelling’ are given different meanings depending on whether the acquisition is intended or not. In the case of the former it includes the existence ‘of a threat to life or limb’ a somewhat casual and ambiguous term which may be difficult to satisfy the exacting standards arising out of the jurisprudence on necessity and national security. In the latter category, national security, the economic well-being of the United Kingdom and the prevention and detection of serious crime are all capable of justifying what is described as the unintentional acquisition of privileged material.

The updated Code of Practice sets out the position in relation to the use and handling of privileged material. Nothing in Re McE changes the evidential status of privileged material; it remains inadmissible. Where there is any doubt about the nature of the material acquired, legal advice must be sought before any dissemination takes place. The material should be clearly marked as legally privileged. It should be protected to a high level ‘to ensure there is no possibility of it becoming available, or its contents becoming known to any person whose possession of it might prejudice any criminal or civil proceedings’.

This is an extraordinary state of legal affairs which has derived from a decision that the Supreme Court was asked to decide in questionable circumstances (the appellants had in fact succeeded in the court below) and in the absence of significant and material authorities. That an issue of such constitutional importance is then eroded yet further in secondary legislation assisted by a poorly drafted updated Code of Practice is unacceptable. It is an area that requires to be urgently reviewed again by the higher courts or it may, without fear of hyperbole, endanger the integrity of the criminal justice system.

Other confidential information

There are special provisions in relation to journalistic material and confidential personal information. The latter is defined in the updated Code of Practice as information ‘held in confidence relating to the physical or mental health or spiritual counselling concerning an individual (whether living or dead) who can be identified from it’. Spiritual counselling means conversations between an individual and a minister of religion acting in an official capacity. The individual being counselled must be seeking or the minister must be imparting ‘forgiveness, absolution or the resolution of conscience with the Devine Being(s) of their faith’.

Confidential journalistic material is defined as including ‘material acquired or created for the purpose of journalism and held subject to an undertaking to hold it in confidence, as well as communications resulting in information being acquired for the purposes of journalism and held subject to such an undertaking’. There is no reference in RIPA and there was none in the former Code of Practice in relation to privilege arising out of the relationship between a Member of Parliament and a member of the public. The updated Code of Practice now deals with it expressly and extends the protection of confidentiality to ‘communications between a Member of Parliament and constituent in respect of constituency matters’.

The view of one respected commentator is that the Code of Practice ‘fails to introduce any independent check into the process even where the material is not most clearly of a private nature’. This is a fair criticism and another area where RIPA and the Code of Practice are found wanting.

397 See Chapter 2, Privacy, Proportionality and Other Human Rights Principles.
401 Code of Practice, para 4.28.
402 Code of Practice, para 3.11.
403 Code of Practice, fn 30.
404 Code of Practice, para 4.29.
405 Fenwick, Civil Liberties and Human Rights, 701.
F. Overt Photography, CCTV, and Related Issues

Photography

Taking photographs of persons or places overtly inexorably falls outside the legislative regime that governs covert policing. The determinative element of whether RIPA is engaged in an activity that is either directed or intrusive surveillance is its covert nature. This does not prevent arguments that RIPA applies being made, even if they are unsuccessful, as in *R v Rosenberg* for example. But this is not the end of the matter; such activities may amount to surveillance within the meaning of section 48(2). Police and other public authorities have the aspiration to act lawfully and will be vulnerable legally if they fail to do so. The Code of Practice may lure them into a false sense of security stating implacably as it does, if there is no interference with privacy, there is no need to seek authorization. The problem is not necessarily a breach of RIPA but the inability to authorize in accordance with law any surveillance other than that which is carried out covertly since no law in fact governs it.

The usefulness of the present state of the law in this area is threefold. First, as discussed at length in Chapter 2, the cases are instructive as to the approach to take in order to determine whether there is an interference with privacy (although the test remains the same, whether the conduct is covert or not). Secondly, it alerts public authorities to the fact that if they engage in activity that is an interference with privacy, they are exposed to a claim under the Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA) and/or the common law for damages, although neither is unlikely to impact on admissibility. Thirdly, it identifies a legislative lacuna that needs to be filled, just as it did in relation to the interception of communications and other forms of surveillance. Since the first edition of this book, an attempt has now been made, in the form of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012, to legislate in a general sense for the use of surveillance cameras.

The Strasbourg position was considered in 1996 by SH Naismith, Solicitor to the Secretariat of the European Commission of Human Rights, in ‘Photographs, Privacy and Freedom of Expression’. It remains a current analysis of the key principles governing this area, subsequent cases simply restating the position or confirming Naismith’s predictions as to how the law would evolve.

The test, in terms of whether Article 8 of the ECHR is engaged by virtue of a public authority taking a photograph of an individual is twofold. First, did the taking of the photograph involve an invasion of privacy in a restricted sense (for example, trespass to property) and was it whilst the person was engaged in a private or public act? Secondly, the ECHR requires an analysis of the purpose, use and dissemination of the photographs.

An example of the first type of case is *Jones v University of Warwick*, although it was not considered as such by the Court of Appeal, who limited its focus to an interference with privacy in the most general sense. The claimant had suffered an injury at work. Her employers engaged the services of private enquiry agents to undertake surveillance of her as they suspected she was exaggerating the impact the injury may have had on her ability to work. Agents attended her address and gained admittance by deception, purporting to be

---

406 RIPA, s 26(2) and (3).
carrying out market research. They filmed her secretly and sought to rely on the footage as evidence of her dishonesty. In due course she applied to exclude the evidence. The District Judge excluded the evidence but this was reversed on appeal. This ruling was upheld by the Court of Appeal but the judgment did not take the more sophisticated approach advocated by Naismith and the case is authority less on the question of the principles to be applied to such cases and more on the question of censuring parties to litigation engaging in ambush tactics.\(^{413}\) An approach, if not principles, can be identified from the judgment.\(^{414}\) First, each case will always be determined on its own facts and in resolving the competing public interests the weight to be attached to each will vary according to the circumstances. The significance of the evidence will differ as will the gravity of the breach of Article 8, according to the facts of the case. The decision on whether to admit the evidence or not will depend on all the circumstances.\(^{415}\)

Wood v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis\(^ {416}\)

5.186 An example of the second type of case is *Wood v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis*.

5.187 The claimant, Wood, a member of the Campaign against the Arms Trade, was photographed leaving the annual general meeting (AGM) of a company concerned in the organization of trade fairs for industries including the arms industry. He had acquired shares in the company for the sole purpose of being eligible to attend the AGM. Other individuals had also done so and had previously caused incidents of a criminal nature at exhibitions and property owned by the company. These individuals were also in attendance and known to the claimant, who spoke to them at the AGM. The claimant himself had no previous convictions and had never been arrested for an offence.

5.188 After leaving the meeting the claimant was not only photographed but was also followed and spoken to by police officers. Enquiries were also subsequently made in order to ascertain the claimant’s identity.

5.189 The Court of Appeal held that the mere taking of an individual’s photograph in a public street itself breaches no rights, ‘unless something more is added’.\(^ {417}\) This ‘something more’ was later described as ‘aggravating circumstances’. These included harassment and hounding and possibly assault.\(^ {418}\)

5.190 The ‘real issue’ was ‘whether the taking of the pictures, along with their actual and/or apprehended use, might amount to a violation’.\(^ {419}\) It is noteworthy, since it is consistent with the Strasbourg approach, that the Court of Appeal did not draw a distinction between the act of taking the picture and its use and retention—such a view was considered ‘too simplistic’.

5.191 A distinction was drawn between the facts in *Wood*\(^ {420}\) and the two leading Strasbourg authorities on the issue, *X v United Kingdom*\(^ {421}\) (photographs taken of the applicant at a public demonstration at which she was voluntarily attending and retention limited for the purposes for which they were taken) and *Friedl v Austria*\(^ {422}\) (photographs of the applicant taken

---

\(^{413}\) *Jones v University of Warwick* [2003] EWCA Civ 151, para 30.

\(^{414}\) *Jones v University of Warwick* [2003] EWCA Civ 151, para 28.

\(^{415}\) See *Martin v McGuiness* [2003] SCLR 548 for a decision where *Jones v University of Warwick* was distinguished.

\(^{416}\) [2009] EWCA Civ 414.

\(^{417}\) *Wood v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis* [2009] EWCA Civ 414, para 35.

\(^{418}\) *Wood v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis* [2009] EWCA Civ 414, para 36.

\(^{419}\) *Wood v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis* [2009] EWCA Civ 414, para 38.

\(^{420}\) *Wood v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis* [2009] EWCA Civ 414.

\(^{421}\) Application No 5877/72 (1973).

\(^{422}\) (1996) 21 EHRR 83.
at a public demonstration with assurances from the government that they were anonymous, retained for the sole purpose for which they were taken and not processed). The Court was unanimous that Article 8(1) was engaged, although was divided on whether Article 8(2) was satisfied.

It was not in issue that the taking of the photographs was in the pursuit of a legitimate aim (prevention and detection of crime). Nor was there significant disagreement on the question of whether the activities of the police were in accordance with the law. It was ultimately an issue of proportionality.

In the view of the majority, the taking and retention of the photographs by the police was disproportionate and Article 8(2) was not satisfied. The interference was sought to be justified on the grounds of protecting the community from low-level criminality or the risk of public disorder, no offence had been committed at least as far as the appellant was concerned so there was no basis to retain the photographs, a position that was not likely to change weeks or even months after the AGM had taken place. Furthermore, trouble-makers had in fact been ejected from the meeting and these did not include the appellant. If there had been a justification for keeping the photographs based on the conversation the appellant had with one of the protagonists, this could only have been for a few days after the meeting had taken place.

The judgment in Wood established a ‘cluster of values’ inherent in Article 8 that were balanced against the need that they are not ‘read so widely that its claims become unreal and unreasonable’. Three safeguards, or qualifications to Article 8 claims existed; antidotes to the risk of its overblown use. First, the actual, proposed or alleged threat to an individual’s personal autonomy must attain ‘a certain level of seriousness’. Secondly, adopting the terminology in Campbell v MGN Limited, the touchstone for Article 8(1)’s engagement is whether on the facts, the individual concerned has a reasonable expectation of privacy, without which there is no interference that falls to be considered. Finally, the scope of Article 8(1) is curtailed in certain circumstances by the justifications available to the state under Article 8(2).

Campbell v Mirror Group Newspapers Limited

The most significant decision in this area remains Campbell, a case involving the publication of details, including photographs taken covertly of supermodel Naomi Campbell’s attendance at Narcotics Anonymous. The claim was based on breach of confidence and a claim for damages under the Data Protection Act 1998.

The House of Lords identified a test for whether the activity in question amounted to a breach of privacy. Lord Hope considered the ‘touchstone of private life’ to be whether in the circumstances of the case, the ‘person in question had a reasonable expectation of privacy’.

The test is twofold; the acquisition of the material and then the publication or disclosure of it. If the material is obviously private, then it follows that it is likely to be highly offensive to proceed to publication and/or disclosure of it. As Randerson J stated in Hosking v Runting, ‘the taking of photographs in a public street must be taken to be one of the

---

ordinary incidents of living in a free community’. The real issue is whether publicizing the content of the photographs would be offensive.\footnote{2003} The test is also an objective one. In order to assess whether the disclosure would be objectionable it is necessary ‘to put oneself into the shoes of a reasonable person who is in need of that treatment’.

Questions of proportionality will arise, collateral intrusion, indeed the use and effect of acquiring the information obtained.

5.198 The decision in \textit{Campbell} has, unsurprisingly, since been applied in a number of cases.\footnote{2003} In \textit{Murray v Big Pictures (UK) Limited},\footnote{2008} the child of Joanne Murray (otherwise known as author JK Rowling) brought proceedings against the defendant company for a breach of confidentiality as his right to respect for privacy had allegedly been infringed following the publication of a photograph of the child with his parents which was published by the \textit{Sunday Express} magazine. The claim was struck out at first instance but was the subject of an appeal as a result of the decision in \textit{Von Hannover v Germany}\footnote{2005} which raised an important point about the relationship between that case and \textit{Campbell},\footnote{2004} notwithstanding that as a matter of law where there is a conflict between the two decisions, the Court of Appeal is bound to follow the domestic decision.

5.199 After some review of the dissenting opinion in \textit{Campbell}, the Court of Appeal was able to identify some commonality between the totality of the appellate committee, at least as to what the first limb of any test should be:

\begin{quote}
In these circumstances, so far as the relevant principles to be derived from \textit{Campbell} are concerned, they can we think be summarised in this way. The first question is whether there is a reasonable expectation of privacy. This is of course an objective question. The nature of the question was discussed in \textit{Campbell}. Lord Hope emphasised that the reasonable expectation was that of the person who is affected by the publicity. He said at [99]: ‘The question is what a reasonable person of ordinary sensibilities would feel is she was placed in the same position as the claimant and faced with the same publicity’. We do not detect any difference between Lord Hope’s opinion in this regard and the opinions expressed by the other members of the appellate committee.
\end{quote}

5.200 The Court of Appeal in \textit{Murray} provided further guidance:

\begin{quote}
As we see it, the question whether there is a reasonable expectation of privacy is a broad one, which takes account of all the circumstances of the case. They include the attributes of the claimant, the nature of the activity in which the claimant was engaged, the place at which it was happening, the nature and purpose of the intrusion, the absence of consent and whether it was known or could be inferred, the effect on the claimant in which and the purposes for which the information came into the hands of the publisher.
\end{quote}

5.201 The principles set out above need as a minimum to form part of a public authority’s policy on the circumstances under which photographs may be taken by them (which should be accessible to members of the public) and to what use they may be put as well as any retention or destruction protocols that exist. But they can be sensibly imported across to covert policing operations in determining whether the public authority is engaging in activity likely to interfere with privacy rights. Public authorities will need to risk-manage the inevitable
increase in civil actions where their activities meet the Wood criteria. Finally it should be a call to action to place such activities on a proper legislative footing.

**CCTV**

CCTV (closed circuit television) is in fact a misnomer, most systems not being closed circuit and networked digitally but it remains a convenient term that is easily understood by the general public. It is not necessarily covert but where it is used as part of a specific investigation or covert operation it may require a directed surveillance authorization pursuant to RIPA. The same principle applies to the use of automatic number plate recognition.

The Venice Commission in its report on *Video Surveillance in Public Places by Public Authorities and the Protection of Human Rights* concluded that:

Video surveillance of public places by public authorities or law enforcement agencies can constitute an undeniable threat to fundamental rights such as the right to privacy and the right to respect for his or her private life, home and correspondence, his/her right to freedom of movement and his/her right to benefit from specific regarding personal data collected by such surveillance.

The Commission made a number of recommendations, including the enactment of specific regulations at both a national and international level which should incorporate compliance with Article 8 and observance of Directive 95/46/EC. In addition, it recommended that the public should be notified of surveillance in public places unless obvious and a specific independent authority established as in the Contracting States of France, Italy, and the Netherlands.

These issues are not the musings of a discrete EU think tank. The civil liberties organization JUSTICE have expressed concern about CCTV more generally and the United Kingdom's 'dubious reputation' in this area, including the country's number of CCTV cameras per capita and the inadequacy of existing legislation to protect privacy rights. Its proposed use as a covert intelligence-gathering counter-terrorist operation in Birmingham was a catastrophe.

There is now, for the first time in United Kingdom law a limited legislative basis for the use of CCTV in the United Kingdom. It remains governed *ex post facto* by the DPA, which unlike RIPA, is not permissive (facilitating and authorizing the use of CCTV) but requires the individual to be proactive (by making a complaint or bringing an action under the DPA). There is a Code of Practice, which provides guidance and advice for CCTV users

---

441 Code of Practice, para 2.28.  
442 Code of Practice, para 2.28.  
443 Council of Europe, European Commission for Democracy through Law.  
446 Venice Commission on Video Surveillance, para 81.  
447 Venice Commission on Video Surveillance, para 82.  
448 Council of Europe, European Commission for Democracy through Law, para 83.  
449 The Impact of Surveillance and Data Collection upon the Privacy of Citizens and their relationship with the State, submission to the House of Lords Constitution Committee, June 2007.  
450 House of Lords Committee Report, para 16.  
on how to comply with DPA and includes a checklist for users of some systems.\textsuperscript{453} This is currently the subject of review.\textsuperscript{454}

5.207 The expectation of privacy an individual has in private is qualitatively different to that which they enjoy in public places but where there is no attempt to identify individuals from the images and they are not entered into a data processing system, there is unlikely to be an interference with privacy.\textsuperscript{455} As Fenwick has observed, ‘even where it is arguable that an invasion of privacy has not occurred, the use of the information later on may create one’.\textsuperscript{456} The expectation extends to companies as well as individuals so the unjustified filming on a company’s premises could amount to an interference with privacy, particularly where they are not asked to consent or expressly withhold it.\textsuperscript{457}

Peck v The United Kingdom\textsuperscript{458}

5.208 The leading judgment on the use and retention of CCTV product is Peck v United Kingdom. The applicant had been filmed by CCTV operators employed by Brentwood Borough Council walking down Brentwood High Street carrying a knife (he was attempting to commit suicide). The police were contacted who arrived at the scene, disarmed him and later detained him under the Mental Health Act 1983. He was subsequently released without charge.

5.209 The council published two still and unedited photographs of Mr Peck in a press bulletin concerned with advancing the positive aspects of using CCTV in the community. One of these appeared in an edition of the Brentwood Weekly News and another local newspaper. Later, elements of the footage appeared on local television and then national broadcasts. The highest audience viewing figures for one of the programmes was 9.2 million. There had been some attempt to mask Mr Peck during the later broadcasts but this was inadequate. Neighbours, friends, and family of the applicant told him they had seen him on television. Mr Peck lodged a complaint with the Broadcasting Standards Commission alleging that the publication of the photographs and footage were a breach of his right to privacy.

5.210 His complaint was upheld and apologies were published and broadcast. A further complaint to the Independent Television Commission was also upheld. However a complaint to the Press Complaints Commission was rejected on the basis that, since the events took place in public, there could be no infringement of Mr Peck’s privacy.

5.211 The decision of the Press Complaints Commission was the subject of an application for judicial review. The High Court dismissed the application on the ground that the local authority concerned had acted lawfully. The application was determined prior to HRA coming into force and the court conceded that the position may have been different had the Act applied.

5.212 Mr Peck petitioned the ECtHR alleging a breach of Article 8 arising out of disclosure of the CCTV footage, which had led to their widespread publication by the local and national media.

\textsuperscript{453} It is available on the Information Commissioner’s website <http://www.ico.gov.uk> (accessed 30 September 2014).
\textsuperscript{455} Friedl v Austria (1996) 21 EHRR 83.
\textsuperscript{456} Fenwick, Civil Liberties and Human Rights, 703.
\textsuperscript{457} R v Broadcasting Standards Commission, ex parte, British Broadcasting Corporation [2000] 3 WLR 1327.
\textsuperscript{458} Application No 44647/98, para 57, ECHR 2003.
Upholding his application, the court held that although the monitoring of individuals by CCTV cameras which did not record the data did not in itself give rise to an interference with private life, the systematic recording or creation of a permanent record of the data did and as such a breach of Article 8(1) arose on the facts of the case. Although Mr Peck was in a public street at the material time, he was not participating in a public event, nor was he a public figure. There had been no effective attempt to prevent his being identified. In addition the dissemination of the data was very considerable, particular that which had been broadcast on television.

The next consideration for the Court was whether the interference was justified under Article 8(2). It was accepted that the disclosure had a proper legal basis and was therefore in accordance with the law. However, the justification failed on proportionality grounds. It was possible to advance the cause of CCTV by using the footage but this could have been done without disclosing Mr Peck’s identity. There were not relevant or sufficient reasons for the disclosures being made in the circumstances. He was not a public figure and had no public role. Nor was he a criminal or a missing person; the objective behind showing the footage could have been achieved by using less intrusive images or by suitably masking Mr Peck’s identity.

There are a number of issues arising out of the use of CCTV, particularly in light of the decision in Wood (acquisition not unlawful, use and retention an interference with privacy not in accordance with law), which have implications for covert and other operations, although more in terms of civil liability than the admissibility of evidence. The increasing attempts to import RIPA into the sphere of private relationships as illustrated by cases like Rosenberg and Leadbetter is a developing area, likely to be the subject of a number of future challenges. As with the decisions relating to photographs, the law in this area is instructive to evolving methodology of approach in terms of operational planning.

CCTV and the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012

The Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 (PFA) regulates CCTV and other surveillance camera technology including Automatic Number Plate Recognition (ANPR).

The Secretary of State is required to prepare a Code of Practice containing guidance about the surveillance camera systems. Surveillance camera systems is defined in s 29(6) and is broad enough to include both CCTV systems and digital or other forms of recording, viewing, storing, receiving, transmitting, processing, or checking images or information. PFA requires that the Code must deal with guidance on certain issues such as the development or use of surveillance camera systems and the use or processing of images obtained from such systems. It also provides for a number of other areas of guidance that may be included and who should be consulted.

The Code, the Surveillance Camera Code of Practice has been issued in accordance with s 30. It sets out a series of twelve guiding principles, many of which attempt to address

---

459 As in the Friedl v Austria judgment of 31 January 1995, Series A no 305-B.
462 (Unreported) Decided by District Judge Parsons in Bournemouth Magistrates’ Court on 4 November 2009.
463 Protection of Freedoms Act 2012, s 29(1).
464 Protection of Freedoms Act 2012, s 29(2).
465 Protection of Freedoms Act 2012, s 29(3).
466 Protection of Freedoms Act 2012, s 29(5).
468 Surveillance Camera Code of Practice, para 2.6.
the failings that have arisen in cases like Peck.\textsuperscript{469} It contains guidance on the development and use of surveillance camera systems\textsuperscript{470} and the use and processing of images and information obtained through their use.\textsuperscript{471} It expressly does not cover covert surveillance but recognizes the use of surveillance camera systems, including private systems for a specific investigation will place this use 'with the bounds of [RIPA]'\textsuperscript{472} This would appear to be inconsistent with the Court of Appeal's decision in \textit{R v Rosenberg}.\textsuperscript{473}

\subsection*{5.219} The Home Office has also published National Standards for ANPR.\textsuperscript{474} Again this recognizes that its use covertly may engage RIPA.\textsuperscript{475} The technology envisages, capturing the vehicle registration mark, which may be retained for up to two years\textsuperscript{476} or where there are criminal proceedings until these are concluded and, in some circumstances, images of the vehicle, although the later is the subject of a much earlier destruction regime unless required for a counter-terrorist or major investigation.\textsuperscript{477} There are anomalies with the acquisition and use of this data. It is comparable to the regime for acquiring and using communications data yet caused no apparent controversy when introduced. This may be because the introduction of the National Standards was inauspicious and followed a number of catastrophic failures in its use, including in connection with the abduction and murder of Ashleigh Hall in 2009. Its potential value may be more obvious than that relating to communications data. In addition, it is difficult to understand the qualitative difference in the nature of the privacy rights at stake when considered alongside decisions such as \textit{Kinloch v Her Majesty's Advocate}. These examples serve to underline the inconsistencies in this area, rather than to identify any principle of importance. Since there now appears to be a clear policy, publicly available, that identifies when such data once acquired will be used and destroyed, it is unlikely to offend current Strasbourg jurisprudence.\textsuperscript{478}

\subsection*{5.220} PFA also provides for the alteration or replacement of the Code\textsuperscript{479} and its effect. No civil or criminal liability is attracted by the failure by a relevant authority\textsuperscript{480} to act in accordance with the Code but it is admissible in civil and criminal proceedings.\textsuperscript{481} A failure by a relevant authority to adhere to the Code can be taken into account by a court or tribunal in any proceedings.\textsuperscript{482}

\subsection*{5.221} The office of the Surveillance Camera Commissioner is created by PFA, s 34. The Commissioner will report annually\textsuperscript{483} on the exercise of his functions in encouraging compliance with the Code, reviewing its operation and providing advice about it.\textsuperscript{484}

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item For example, principle 2, the need to take into account its effect on individual's privacy, and principle 6, requirement to delete images once they are no longer required for the stated purpose has been discharged. 
\item Surveillance Camera Systems Code of Practice, chapter 3.
\item Surveillance Camera Systems Code of Practice, chapter 4.
\item Surveillance Camera Systems Code of Practice, para 1.10. \textsuperscript{473} [2006] EWCA Crim 6.
\item National ANPR Standards for Policing, Part 2, para 4.1.
\item National ANPR Standards for Policing, Part 1, para 5.2.
\item National ANPR Standards for Policing, Part 2, para 10.3.2.
\item \textit{S and Marper v The United Kingdom} (Application Nos 30562/04 and 30566/04) 4 December 2008.
\item Protection of Freedoms Act 2012, s 31.
\item A list of relevant authorities in set out in s 33(5) and includes police and local authorities, for example. 
\item Protection of Freedoms Act 2012, s 33(3). \textsuperscript{482} Protection of Freedoms Act 2012, s 33(4).
\item Protection of Freedoms Act 2012, s 35.
\item Set out in Protection of Freedoms Act 2012, s 34(2).
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
Surveillance of employees

Surveillance of employees falls outside the compass of RIPA and is essentially an issue of employment law. Employee calls may be lawfully intercepted without external authorization under the Telecommunications (Lawful Business Practice) (Interception of Communications) Regulations 2000\(^{485}\) for the purposes of investigating unauthorized use, or establishing facts and checking compliance for example.\(^{486}\) The only requirement is that it is undertaken for the sole purpose of monitoring or keeping records relevant to the business, that the system is used partly or wholly in connection with the business and all reasonable efforts have been made to inform those who may use the system that communications may be intercepted.\(^{487}\)

The Data Protection Code on Employment Practices also applies.\(^{488}\) This imposes obligations to assess the need to monitor, including whether the objective could be achieved by other means. There are notification requirements so that employees know what constitutes an unacceptable use of email, the internet, and telephone calls. Employees should also know when monitoring may be carried out and are reminded of the existence of the policy and any changes to it. There are also rules about the circumstances under which covert monitoring can be undertaken.\(^{489}\)

As has already been discussed, RIPA does not apply to a public authority’s ordinary functions.\(^{490}\)

Admissibility

The question of admissibility is considered in detail in Chapter 9. There have been a small number of decisions involving breaches or alleged breaches of RIPA. Broadly speaking, breaches, whether made in good or bad faith, will not result in the evidence being excluded. Only in the most exceptional cases has a breach of RIPA resulted in a stay of proceedings\(^{491}\) and the correctness of this decision has been questioned.\(^{492}\)

In *Mason and others*,\(^{493}\) a case determined before RIPA came into force, the Home Office Guidelines were not followed in that normal methods of investigation had not been tried and failed before a covert police surveillance operation was launched, which included listening devices being placed in the police cells of suspects arrested and the home of another suspect. Having heard extensive arguments on this issue (and other issues not relevant to the present analysis) the Court of Appeal held that the judge had exercised his discretion not to exclude the surveillance evidence correctly since he had found that there was no bad faith on the part of the Chief Constable or his officers. This case is also authority for it not being necessary to actually try traditional policing methods and fail before deploying covert policing resource. The court was of the view that it was only necessary to consider conventional policing methods and to ensure reasons could be advanced for ruling them out.

In *Hoekstra and others v Her Majesty’s Advocate*\(^{494}\) the Scottish Appeal Court held that a tracking device planted on a ship which had not been disclosed to the defence (although

---

\(^{485}\) SI 2000/2699.
\(^{486}\) SI 2000/2699, reg 3(1).
\(^{487}\) SI 2000/2699, reg 3(2).
\(^{490}\) *C v Police and Secretary of State*, 14 November 2006, IPT/03/32/H.
\(^{491}\) *Grant v R* [2005] EWCA Crim 1098 and the related cases of *Sutherland* and *Sentence*.
\(^{494}\) [2002] ScotHC 343.
the defence were aware of its existence) was a circumstance ‘which weighs heavily against admission of any evidence arising from its use’ but declined to exclude it.495 Similarly, the same court in *Gilchrist and Quinn v Her Majesty’s Advocate*496 held that an authorization, that the Crown conceded was invalid, did not result in the exclusion of the evidence since what was observed occurred in a public place.497

5.228 A good faith failure to authorize visual as well as audio may result in a breach of the Human Rights Act but this would not result in the exclusion of the evidence: see *R v Button and Tannahill*.498 Contrast this case with *Grant*,499 where the Court of Appeal held that proceedings should be stayed where the police had deliberately placed surveillance devices in locations that would pick up conversations between suspects and their lawyers and *Warren v Attorney General of the Bailiwick of Jersey*,500 where a stay was narrowly avoided where the court found officers had deliberately lied about the installation of a listening device.

5.229 In *R v Linda Rosenberg*501 the appellant was convicted of drug-related offences and appealed on the basis that the trial judge had erred in admitting CCTV footage passed to the police by her neighbours. It was the appellant’s case that the surveillance ought to have been authorized under Part II of RIPA. The Court of Appeal held that the nature of the surveillance could never be considered covert for the purposes of section 29(9)(a) (‘surveillance is covert, if and only if, it is carried out in a manner that is calculated to ensure that persons who are subject to surveillance are unaware that it is or may be taking place’).502 Even if the trial court was satisfied that there had been a breach of Article 8, the judge would have been entitled to admit it since it was, on carrying out the necessary review, fair to admit it. The Court was not invited to consider the European jurisprudence in the area. There was no consideration of section 80. Nor was there was no attempt to explore whether the relationship the police shared with the Brewers may have amounted to use and conduct of covert human intelligence sources.

5.230 In *R v Sutherland*503 police had installed listening devices at two police stations in Lincolnshire. Contrary to the terms of the authorizations, the devices were installed in the exercise yards where it was accepted that it was common practice for solicitors to hold consultations with their clients, since this was the only place they could smoke. Consequently, the risk of picking up conversations attracting legal professional privilege was high and in fact occurred. The authorizations expressly stated that the risk of picking up confidential material was low. After a lengthy voir dire, Newman J concluded that officers had been dishonest in the deployment, dissemination, and retention of the privileged material obtained. An indictment containing counts of murder and conspiracy to murder was stayed. In a later case emanating from the same area and where the same officers were involved, the rationale of the trial judge was approved by the Court of Appeal.504

5.231 More recently in *R v Harmes and Crane*,505 a case relating to the use and conduct of undercover police officers as covert human intelligence sources, the Court of Appeal described

---

495 Hoekstra v Her Majesty’s Advocate, para 30.
497 *Gilchrist and Quinn v Her Majesty’s Advocate*, para 21.
499 *Grant v R* [2005] EWCA Crim 516.
503 (Nottingham Crown Court, 29 January 2002).
504 *R v Grant* [2005] EWCA Crim LR (Nov). See also Ormerod and Waterman, ‘Abusing a Stay for Grant?’, 5–14.
505 [2006] EWCA Crim 928.
their actions and the authorization process as being ‘serious breaches of the Act and Code’. Despite this the court was, on balance, of the view that ‘the officers’ conduct viewed as a whole, did not stray beyond that which was permissible to investigate and prosecute crime.

In *Plunkett and another v R* and *Khan and others v R* the Court of Appeal held that the absence of authorization or exceeding its terms may amount to a breach of Article 8 but would not, without more, result in the evidence derived from the resource being excluded. These decisions are broadly consistent with the common law position before RIPA came into force and Strasbourg jurisprudence.

What would constitute more is likely to be evidence of trickery, manipulation of the court’s process, oppression, inducement, misrepresentation or entrapment. It may also include deliberate non-compliance with RIPA. The Chief Surveillance Commissioner hinted in his 2012–2013 Annual Report:

> The fact historically, there has been no legal challenge to the way in which a public authority conducts its covert procedures does not mean that the procedures are unchallengeable, nor is the absence of such a challenge mitigation for poor compliance. On the contrary, if a challenge is made, it is unlikely that a trial judge will be sympathetic to an argument that the public authority was entitled to do things in its own way if that way is at variance from published OSC guidance or comment in an OSC inspection report. The purpose of my inspection is to highlight the risk of being challenged for non-compliance. It is not acceptable to act in a non-compliant way unless caught. [RIPA] requires certain activity to be authorized by competent staff and it should be.

### Online surveillance

In his 2012–2013 Annual Report, the Chief Surveillance Commissioner, Sir Christopher Rose, expressed the following view:

> I am encouraged by the increasingly mature debate relating to the use of the Internet for investigative purposes, especially the use of social networking sites. It is not always adequate to conflate the off-line with the on-line worlds and I am satisfied that some investigations require authorization. There are points of detail to work out, particularly in relation to repeated viewing of a publicly available site but, in the main, RIPA Part II can be used effectively. I will continue to support the production of accurate Home Office and ACPO guidance. But it is important to bear in mind that it is not always possible to give definite answer as to whether a particular activity requires authorization: facts are infinitely variable. Where there is doubt authorization is prudent.

The use of the content of social networking sites as evidence is only as new as the phenomenon itself. It has been used as evidence to prove the commission of an offence in a range of different cases, from gang membership to harassment. Conflation with the ‘off-line

---

506 [2006] EWCA Crim 928, para 42.  
507 [2006] EWCA Crim 928, para 54.  
508 [2013] EWCA Crim 261.  
509 [2013] EWCA Crim 2230.  
511 See *Khan v The United Kingdom* (2001) 31 EHRR 45 and *PG and JH v The United Kingdom* [2002] Crim LR 308 as just two examples.  
512 *Khan and others v R* [2013] EWCA Crim 2230, para 37.  
515 For example, *R v Bucknor* [2010] EWCA Crim 1152.  
516 For example, *R v Rizwan* [2003] EWCA Crim 3067.
world’ may not always be adequate but it is not a bad starting point. The essential question to be asked is whether in the circumstances of the case, an expectation of privacy arises. In most cases where information is published in the public domain, it is unlikely to do so. However, issues arise surrounding the recording, retention and systematic storage of the data acquired. So for example, where the police take overt photographs of an individual at public meeting, no interference with privacy arises in principle but where the photographs are added to a file for the purposes of making further inquiries or to build a permanent record, privacy rights may be engaged.

5.236 In their seminal article for Criminal Law Review, ‘Social networking sites, RIPA and Criminal Investigations,’ O’Floinn and Ormerod summarized the position in this way:

In short, non-private information can become private information in the sense used in RIPA depending on its retention and use. As an example, if local authority officers take photographs of an individual’s café on one occasion for the purpose of securing an image of the exterior, no private information is acquired. If they photograph the premises more frequently for the purpose of establishing patterns of occupancy ‘the accumulation of information is likely to result in the obtaining of private information about that person.’ This is, we submit, similar to the distinction between one-off and repeated viewing (and retention) of [Social Networking Site] profile information.

5.237 It will also be important to consider the purpose behind the viewing of the material and whether this is being done covertly. In a view that resonates with the Chief Surveillance Commissioner’s, O’Floinn and Ormerod conclude that:

[t]he present state of the law is unclear as to whether systematic monitoring of public [Social Networking Site] profiles constitutes covert surveillance. Is there sufficient ‘calculation’ to ensure a lack of awareness, simply by the police going on-line and repeatedly viewing a profile without the target’s knowledge? It would seem significant (though not determinative) that the individual would not actually know that the surveillance is occurring, and a judge may be more willing to find sufficient calculation if an interference with privacy is found.

Observation posts

5.238 The fact that surveillance has been carried out is unlikely to be a fact that will need to be kept from the defence. In R v Sutherland, Newman J noted that ‘as a general rule, I can see no sound basis for withholding the fact of and content of covert surveillance of a defendant’s activities and conversation’. The same can generally be said of non-sensitive parts of the authorities granted.

5.239 However where surveillance is carried out from a static position, in particular residential premises, there may be a requirement to protect both the identity of those who have facilitated this as well as the address, particularly if there is either a threat or perceived threat of violence or harassment. This is so even where the accused says that it goes to his or her

---

517 See for example Rotaru v Romania (2000) 8 BHRC.
520 Code of Practice on Covert Surveillance and Property Interference, para 2.6.
522 O’Floinn and Ormerod, ‘Social networking sites’, 778.
523 O’Floinn and Ormerod, ‘Social networking sites’, 779.
525 Blake v DPP (1993) 97 Cr App R 169.
innocence, providing the Crown can establish an evidential foundation for it to be admitted.\textsuperscript{527} The leading case is \textit{R v Johnson},\textsuperscript{528} which established the following guidance:

The police officer in charge of the observations to be conducted, no one of lower rank than a sergeant should usually be acceptable for this purpose must be able to testify that beforehand he visited all observation places to be used and ascertained the attitude of the occupiers of premises, not only to the use to be made of them, but to the possible disclosure thereafter of the use made and facts which could lead to identification of the premises thereafter and of the occupiers. He may of course in addition inform the court of difficulties, if any, usually encountered in the particular locality of obtaining assistance from the public.

A police officer of no lower rank than a chief inspector must be able to testify that immediately prior to the trial he visited the places used for observations, the results of which it is proposed to give in evidence, and ascertained whether the occupiers are the same as when the observations took place and whether they are or are not, what the attitude of those occupiers is to the possible disclosure of the use previously made of the premises and of facts which could lead at the trial to identification of premises and occupiers.\textsuperscript{529}

Where the observation post is an unmarked police car the protection is unlikely to be afforded.\textsuperscript{530}

\textbf{Foreign surveillance operations in the United Kingdom}

RIPA was amended by the Crime (International Co-Operation) Act 2003 to provide for the regulation of foreign surveillance operations conducted in the United Kingdom.\textsuperscript{531}

The provisions apply where a foreign police or customs officer\textsuperscript{532} is carrying out relevant surveillance outside the United Kingdom that is lawful under the law of the country where it is being carried out.\textsuperscript{533} Circumstances must then arise that means the surveillance can be carried out in the United Kingdom\textsuperscript{534} but it is not reasonably practicable to obtain a Part II authorization or the equivalent authorization under the Regulation of Investigatory Powers (Scotland) Act 2000.\textsuperscript{535}

Relevant surveillance is defined in s 76A(2). It is either directed or intrusive surveillance for the purposes of Part II and carried out in relation to a person suspected of having committed a relevant crime. Relevant crime is one that falls within Article 40(7) of the Schengen Convention or any other international agreement to which the United Kingdom is a party and specified for the purposes of s 76A by the Secretary of State with the consent of Scottish ministers.\textsuperscript{536}

Relevant surveillance will carried out lawfully in the United Kingdom if a number of conditions are met. These are that (i) a person designated by the Director General of the NCA is notified immediately after the foreign officer enters the United Kingdom and the designated officer applies, if he has not already, for a Part II authorization;\textsuperscript{537} (ii) the foreign officer limits the surveillance to places to which members of the public have access;\textsuperscript{538} and any additional conditions specified by the Secretary of State with the consent of Scottish ministers in relation to the carrying out of the surveillance are satisfied.\textsuperscript{539} It will cease to be

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{527} \textit{R v Rankine} [1986] QB 861.
\item \textsuperscript{528} \textit{R v Johnson} [1988] 1 WLR 1377.
\item \textsuperscript{529} \textit{R v Brown} (1987) 87 Cr App R 52.
\item \textsuperscript{530} \textit{RIPA} s 76A.
\item \textsuperscript{531} \textit{RIPA}, s 76A.
\item \textsuperscript{532} Defined in \textit{RIPA}, s 76A(10).
\item \textsuperscript{533} \textit{RIPA}, s 76A(1)(a).
\item \textsuperscript{534} \textit{RIPA}, s 76A(1)(b).
\item \textsuperscript{535} \textit{RIPA}, s 76A(1)(c).
\item \textsuperscript{536} \textit{RIPA}, s 76A(3).
\item \textsuperscript{537} \textit{RIPA}, s 76A(4) and (6).
\item \textsuperscript{538} \textit{RIPA}, s 76A(4)(b); access includes where payment is required or otherwise.
\item \textsuperscript{539} \textit{RIPA}, s 76A(4)(c).
\end{itemize}
lawful if the officer seeks to stop and question the person who is the subject of the surveil-
ance. No civil liability will arise in respect of the conduct authorized which is incidental to
it being carried out.\textsuperscript{540}

5.245 The permitted period for such surveillance to take place is five hours beginning with
the time when the officer enters the United Kingdom.\textsuperscript{541} However, somewhat per-
versely, the designated person is empowered when giving the notification to notify the
officer that the surveillance has ceased to be lawful by virtue of s 76A(4).\textsuperscript{542} If an authoriza-
tion is obtained the Code of Practice states that this means the surveillance can exceed
the permitted period. However this appears to be at odds with s 76A.\textsuperscript{543}

**Surveillance product and voice identification**

5.246 As to the reliance on surveillance product as voice analysis see \textit{R v Flynn and St John}.\textsuperscript{544}

### H. The Future of Surveillance

5.247 There needs to be an awakening to the fact that the approach to planning and authorizing of
cover surveillance operations as well as the legal audit of them requires more sophistication.
This is the responsibility of all the actors involved in the process: police and public authority
personnel, lawyers and judges.

5.248 The plethora of reports that have been published over recent years demonstrates that sur-
veillance is a political issue and is likely to be the subject of legislative change in politically
temperamental times. Outside of the politics of surveillance there are opportunities for
reform and evolution in the areas of overt photography and private surveillance in the same
way the regulation of CCTV has occurred.

5.249 The challenges of responding to the activities of increasingly versatile, innovative and
resourced criminals and terrorists requires a unified and practical working legal frame-
work within which covert responses can be authorized, reviewed, and overseen. At present
RIPA does not achieve this. Ferguson and Wadham have opined that ‘areas of questionable
Convention compliance were identified prior to the enactment of RIPA and subsequent
experience of the Act has done little to assuage those concerns’.\textsuperscript{545} Fenwick has added her
own concerns—‘the value of individual privacy is it is argued, consistently and readily over-
come, at almost every point in the arrangements at which a choice was made’.\textsuperscript{546} It is not
necessary to go back to the drawing board but refining the legislation and educating those
working in this arena or grappling with its legal consequences is essential.

\textsuperscript{540} RIPA, s 76A(5).
\textsuperscript{541} RIPA, s 76A(7).
\textsuperscript{542} RIPA, s 76A(8).
\textsuperscript{543} Code of Practice, para 5.21.
\textsuperscript{544} \[2008\] 2 Cr App R 266.
\textsuperscript{545} Ferguson and Wadham, ‘Privacy and Surveillance: A Review of the Regulation of the Investigatory
\textsuperscript{546} Fenwick, \textit{Civil Liberties and Human Rights}, 724.